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From the Bubble Act to the pre-incorporation 
trust: investor protection in Quebec law* 
Robert DEMERS 
La possibilité de lier une compagnee qui n'existe pas par un contrat 
conclu en son nom avant sa date d'incorporation reste un des problèmes 
les plus difficiles du droit corporaiif contemporain. Au Québec, la ques-
tion des contrats pré-incorporatifs est en partie traitée à l'article 29 de la 
Loi des compagnies S.R. 1964 c. 271, qui permet la création d'un 
fidéicommis en vue d'une constitution en corporation. 
L'origine de l'article 29 reste énigmatique : l'historique de cette dis-
posiiion nous renvoie à l'étude du phénomène des compagnies 
non-incorporées au Québec et d'une manière plus générale, à llexamen 
du Bubble Act, première loi des temps modernes à réglementer, pour la 
protection de l'épargn,, les activités des compagnies à but lucratif. 
L'introduction historique permet de placer l'article 29 dans sa 
véritable perspective et nous amène à considérer le fidéicommis 
pré-incorporatif dans ses applicaiions particulières. Auss,, la jurispru-
dence et la doctrine ont établi des règles précises concernant 
l'interprétation, la création et l'effet de ce fidéicommis statutaire et ces 
divers points sont examinés en détail. Enfin, la discussion aborde le sujet 
des devoirs des promoteurs à l'égard de la future compagnee et des tiers 
investisseurs. 
Le fidéicommis pré-incorporatif permet donc d'observer, dans un 
panorama historique qui couvre près de trois siècles, le souci constant 
des législateuss et des tribunaux de protéger l'investissement contre la 
cupidité des spéculateurs et fait ressortir, dans les législations contem-
poraines en la matière, la pérennité des problèmss soulevés et des solu-
tions retenues. 
* Cet article est un chapitre d'une thèse de doctorat présentée en vue de l'obtention d'un doc-
torat en droit à l'Université de Cambridge, Angleterre. 
** B.C.L. (McGill) Ph.D. (Cantab.), professeur adjoint à la Faculté de droit de l'Université 
Laval. 
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The historical spoor of the corporation 
indeed leads into the past but unfortu-
nately goes nowhere in particular but 
rather everywheee in general. 
G. F. McGuigan, "The emergence of 
the unincorporated company in 
Canada," (1964) 2 Ü.B.C. Law R. 31, 
at pp. 32-33. 
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The problem of adequate protection of the investing public is proba-
bly as old as company law itself. The Bubble Act1 was the first statute of 
modern times that made any serious attempt to regulate the securities 
market for the benefit of investors2. As will be shown, this enigmatic 
piece of legislation had considerable impact not only on the general com-
plexion of modern company law but also influenced the evolution of 
commercial law even in the British colonies. 
Thus, in Lower-Canada, the Bubble Act made a timid appearance 
and brought about the formation of unincorporated companies, a rather 
singular anomaly in a civil law jurisdiction. Moreover, in Quebec law, 
much of the discussion on promoters and their duties is somewhat related 
to this historical enquiry. For this reason, it was considered useful to 
examine many of the controverted issues surrounding the historical as-
pects of Quebec law on company promotion before embarking upon a 
detailed analysis of promoters' rights and duties in that jurisdiction. 
This approach affords an interesting vista on the peculiarities of 
Quebec law in this field: the simultaneous application of the Civil Code, 
the Companies Act3 and the Securities Act4 to company promotions in 
Quebec will indicate clearly enough the unique position resulting from 
such interaction. 
I. The Bubble Act and its implications 
A. T H E Bubble Act IN ENGLAND 
1. The rise and fall of the South Sea Company 
Up to the beginning of the eighteenth century, English companies 
were usually royal enterprises5 and participation in the management and 
capital of such corporations was limited to a privileged few6. However, 
1. (1720) 6 Geo. I c. 18 (U.K.). 
2. L.C.B. GOWER, The principles of modern company law, 3rd ed, Stevens and Sons, 
London, 1969, at p. 30. 
3. R.S.Q. 1964 c. 271. (Hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act.) 
4. R.S.Q. 1964 c. 274. (Hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act.) 
5. W. R. SCOTT, The constitution and finanee of English. Scottish and Irish joint-stock 
companies to 1720. vol. I. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1912. at p. 341; C. 
A. COOKE, Corporaiion, trust and company, Manchester University Press, Manches-
ter, 1950, at pp. 49-52, 60 and 61. In the earlier part of the seventeenth century, new 
corporations were viewed as a threat to "the Common Wealth": Sir E. COKE, The 
second part of the Institutes, 3rd ed., Crooke & Co., London, 1669, at p. 540. 
6. GOWER, op. cit., at pp. 24-25; Cooke, op. cit., at pp. 57-58. 
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the commercial evolution of the country favoured the multiplication of 
private companies: division of share capital into relatively small fractions 
gave the ordinary bourgeois an opportunity of sharing in the prosperity of 
the land7, and private companies became a common feature of the period. 
The creation of capital also called for its circulation and it was at that 
same time that stockbrokers made their appearance in the coffee-houses 
of London8. 
In this climate of economic prosperity the South Sea Company was 
founded in 17119. It is important to note that its main promoter, Lord 
Harley, was at the time Chancellor of the Exchequer10, and that the par-
ticipation of the government in the affairs of this company was to be so 
active that King George I himself became governor in the elections of 
1718". This was no mere coincidence: the national debt, in 1711, reached 
millions of pounds and Harley somehow hoped to rid the nation of this 
burden with his new company12. His plan was a clever one: government 
bonds, which formed the bulk of the national debt, became redeemable in 
exchange for shares in the South Sea Company13. 
The formula was very popular: holders of government securities 
were more than happy to exchange them for shares the value of which 
was rising steadily because of intense speculation. But this success was 
short lived: the Company's main asset was the national debt and although 
the quotation of shares was to reach incredible heights14, this bore no 
relation to the Company's true value. Speculation became hysterical: the 
government's approval of the South Sea scheme had the adverse effect of 
7. SCOTT, op. cit., at p. 341. Before 1700, the value of a single share was so considerable 
that ordinary persons had to associate in order to buy one. Thus, in the New River 
Company, one share was worth £258. Vide Scott, ibid., at p. 155. 
8. For an interesting and humorous history of that period, vide A. JENKINS, The Stock 
Exchange Story, Heinemann, London, 1973, at pp. 16-39; E. V. MORGAN and 
W. A. THOMAS, The Stock Exchange, Elek Books, London, 1969, at pp. 11-42. 
9. G O W E R , op. cit,, at p. 28, n. 28. 
10. JENKINS, op. cit,, at p . 27. 
11. J. CARSWELL, The South Sea Bubble, The Cresset Press, London, 1960, at p. 73. Even 
the royal mistresses had their share of the benefits that were to come out of this 
national enterprise: on this last point, vide L. O. PIKE, A history of crime in England, 
vo.. 2, Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1873-76, at p . 303. The official parliamentary 
enquiry that was to investigate into the affairs of the Company after 1720 showed the 
incredible degree of official corruption that marked this whole era: Pike, op. cit., at 
pp. 303-304. Vide also Cooke, op. cit., at p. 82. 
12. JENKINS, op. cit,, at pp. 27-28. 
13. CARSWELL, op. cit., at pp. 35 and 54; Cooke, op. cit., at pp. 82-83. 
14. In June 1720, the shares were quoted at 1000 but fell in the same year to 124 in 
December: Jenkins, op. cit., at p. 32. 
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encouraging the creation of all types of companies that were formed for 
the sole purpose of creating a market for their shares15. The passion for 
gaming in stocks that possessed the London market was finally calmed by 
the proclamation of the Bubble Act16. 
The exact effect of that statute to this day remains somewhat of a 
mystery17: it declared illegal certain undertakings that acted as corporate 
bodies and raised a transferable stock without authority of a royal charter 
or Act of Parliament and outlawed undertakings acting under obsolete 
charters18. However, it exempted from these prohibitions companies 
formed before 171819 and all partnerships20. 
The Bubble Act was in no way intended as a sanction against the 
South Sea Company: on the contrary, some authorities suggest that it was 
enacted to eliminate competition in favour of that body21. The public, 
however, lost confidence: shares dropped in value dramatically and in-
vestors lost considerable fortunes. A Parliamentary enquiry revealed the 
extent of official corruption that finally caused the collapse of the Com-
pany22, but other scapegoats had to be found to satisfy the public's need 
for culprits. Attention was directed to "the pernicious art of 
Stock-jobbing"23, that had appeared recently on the London market, but 
this was not a satisfying victim. The public became somehow convinced 
that responsibility for the whole collapse lay not with the government or 
the brokers but with the numerous joint-stock companies formed during 
the last decade. Companies became an "object of suspicion and attack"24 
and this popular feeling was to have important repercussions on the future 
of company law in England. 
24. C. T. CARR, The general principles of the law of corporaiion,, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1905, at pp. 107-108. 
15. GOWER, op. cit.. at p. 28. 
16. GOWER, op. cit,, at pp. 28-30. 
17. GOWER, op. cit.. at p. 29: "Exactly what it did is, however, somewhat obscure . . . " 
18. (1720) 6 Geo. I c. 18, s. 18. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. CARSWELL, op. cit., at p. 139; Cooke, op. cit., at pp. 83-84. 
22. SCOTT, op. cit,, at p. 437. 
23. JENKINS, op. cit., at p. 20, referring to a report of the Parliamentary Commission on 
Trade in England (1696). Some attempt was made to blame the whole scandal on 
brokers: CARSWELL, op. cit., at p. 16. Brokers had been viewed with great suspicion 
since their appearance in Change Alley and "it would not be a serious exaggeration to 
say that after the revolution the stockbroker gradually replaced the Jesuit as 
everyman's idea of a conspirator . . . " CARSWELL, ibid. 
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2. Unincorporated joint-stock companies 
Most commentators agree that the main effect of the Bubble Act was 
to restrain for more than a century the incorporation of commercial enter-
prises: after the great Bubble, companies remained unpopular in the pub-
lic eye and, as a general rule, the Crown refused to grant charters to 
promoters of such associations25. Business however continued: some 
corporate form was necessary to allow for the association of individuals 
and the creation of capital, and this is where the unincorporated joint-
stock company reappeared on the commercial scene. Such bodies had 
always existed, but after 1720 they became extremely popular26. 
The companies were formed, like partnerships, by a contract27 
whereby the parties agreed to be united in an undertaking with a fixed 
capital, divided into transferable shares28. Unlike a partnership, however, 
the real and personal property of the company was transferred to a trus-
tee29 or a group of trustees30: this particular feature allowed the trustee to 
act without having to assemble all of the shareholders31. The trustee was 
the only person who had a sufficient interest to bring actions at law for the 
protection of the property held by him32 but this right of action had 
25. A. B. Du Bois, The English business company after the Bubble Act 1720-1800, The 
Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1938, at pp. 1-41; GOWER, op. cit., at p. 32; R. R. 
PENNINGTON, Company Law, 3rd ed., Butterworths, London, 1973, at p. 8; COOKE, 
op. cit., at pp. 80 and 186; W. S. HOLDSWORTH, The early history of commercial 
societies (1916) 28 Juridical R. 305, at pp. 340-344. 
26. SCOTT, op. cit., at pp. 246-247, shows that such companies had existed before the 
South Sea Bubble. Sea also: G. F. M C G U I G A N , The emergenee of the unincorporated 
company in Canada (1964) 2 U.B.C. Law R. 31 at p. 37. 
27. Du Bois, op. cit., at p. 217; the members signed a deed of settlement containing the 
conditions of their contract. Vide also J. SMITH et Y. R E N A U D , Droit québécoss des 
corporations commerciales, vol. 1, Judico Inc., Montréal, 1974, at p. 11. 
28. G O W E R , op. cit,, at p. 33. 
29. Du Bois, op. cit., at p. 217; COOKE, op. cit., at pp. 86-87. The trustee ordinarily acted 
on the instructions of the members, when questions arose concerning this property: 
G O W E R , op. cit,, at p . 34. 
30. L. S. SEALY, Equitable obligations in the management and promotion of ccmpanies, 
Yorke Prize Essay, Cambridge, 1959, at pp. 39-40, 42 n. 25. 
31. Supra n. 29. It is interesting to note that this same argument is used in Quebec law to 
justify the existence of a trustee under the Special Corporate Powers Act R.S.Q. 1964, 
c. 275. The trustee for bondholders under a trust deed made in pursuance of that 
statute can sue at law for any question arising out of the deed to the exclusion of the 
bondholders. This is predicated on questions of convenience: Cité de Trois-Rivières v. 
The Sun Trust Co. (1923) 34 Que. K.B. 351, at pp. 353, 357 and 364. 
32. Du Bois, op. cit,, at p. 218. 
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definite limits33. In certain cases, the trustee was also responsible for the 
transfer of shares in the company34. 
Thus, the unincorporated company centered on the trustee: in the 
eighteenth century, he was a common feature of the commercial life35 and 
the unincorporated company is a good illustration of his omnipresence. 
Considerable research has been carried out on the legal aspects of such 
companies36 and it is beyond the scope of our enquiry to discuss this: 
however, it is the more striking features of unincorporated bodies that 
should be underlined. 
The presence of a trustee and a transferable stock37 indicates a major 
difference between such companies and partnerships and highlights the 
thin line that divided them from the despised chartered corporations38. 
The Bubble Act in England thus had a double effect. It prevented the 
massive incorporation of companies for private purposes and encouraged 
the creation of unincorporated bodies. This was to change the traditional 
forms of corporate activity and had a lasting impact on English law. Even 
to this day, the law reports contain the odd references to that disastrous 
era39. 
33. The only rights of action that the trustee had were those relating to the property of the 
company that was vested in him: for any other question involving the company, the 
whole body had to be called in although the courts of equity tried to relax this difficult 
requirement: Du Bois, op. cit., at pp. 220-221. In a sense, this is the rule of Foss v. 
Harbotlle (1843) 2 Hare 461 as applied to unincorporated companies. 
34. Du Bois, op. cit.. at p. 222. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Du Bois, op. cit., chapter 3. 
37. Du Bois, op. cit.. at pp. 233-235. 237 and 239 for more details on the trustee; pp. 222. 
232, 238-241, 359-360 for more details on the transferable shares. 
38. R. R. Formoy, The historical foundations of modem company law. Sweet and Max-
well, London, 1923, at pp. 38 and following. 
39. See, e.g.. Lord Cross' speech in Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1973] A.C. 
360, at p. 383. Note that a similar sequence of events happened in France at the same 
period: this was Law's famous Mississippi scheme that brought ruin to the whole of 
the Kingdom. See J. Escarra et J. Rault, Traité théorique et pratique de droit commer-
cial, vol. 1, Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1950, at pp. 19 and following, for a historical study of 
this question. See also: Green v. Charterhouee Group Canada Ltd. [1973] 2 O.R. 677. 
at p. 709. The prohibition under the new federal act of paying for shares with promis-
sory notes [Canada Business Corporaiions Act S.C. 1974-75-76 c. 33, s. 25 (5)] might 
be a statutory safeguard against future bubble companies: as seen above, the South 
Sea Co. was financed in major part by the national debt (supra n. 13) with the curious 
result that the company's main asset was in fact a liability of millions of pounds. The 
federal legislature clearly indicated in s. 25 of the new Act the danger of such methods 
of finance by refusing to allow the creation of corporate capital with liabilities, private 
or national. 
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Whether the Bubble Act had any repercussions in Quebec is the 
question that will now be examined: at the outset, it might be observed 
that a jurisdiction of civil law could adapt only with great difficulty to this 
type of legislation and that the reception of such a statute in Quebec could 
possibly result in some legal anomaly. 
B. THE Bubble Act IN LOWER-CANADA 
In 1763, more than forty years after the Bubble Act, the French 
colony of Nouvelle-France was ceded to the English by the Treaty of 
Paris. This had important consequences from the point of view of com-
pany law: the granting of letters-patent to corporations became a matter 
of discretion for the representatives of the English King and, surely, the 
views of the colony's administrators were not much different in this re-
spect from those of the Attorney-General in England. Whether or not the 
Bubble Act was applicable in the new colony will now be examined and 
the subsidiary question of knowing whether unincorporated companies 
appeared in the province will also be discussed. 
1. The Bubble Act in Quebec 
The state of the laws in the new English colony after 1763 was so 
confused that it has been described as "a sort of noisy chaos" by one 
commentator40. To determine whether or not a particular English statute 
applied thus becomes a difficult exercise and the Bubble Act is no excep-
tion to this rule. 
Did the Treaty of Paris have the effect of introducing to the colony 
English law and, more particularly, the Bubble Actl 
When a foreign colony is conquered or ceded, constitutional law 
indicates that the laws in force in that colony remain valid until they are 
repealed by the Crown. Thus, Blackstone writes: 
"But in conquered or ceded countries, that have already laws of their own, the 
King may indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he does actually change 
them, the ancient laws of the country remain . . . Our American plantations are 
principally of this latter sort, being obtained in the last century either by right of 
40. H. M. Neatby, The administration of justice under the Quebec Act, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1937, at p. 3. The author also quotes Chief Justice 
Smith who considered the law of that period as some kind of "comedy of errors": 
ibid., at p. 228. Vide also pp. 154-155. 
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conquest and driving out the natives . . . or by treaties. And therefore the com-
mon law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority there . . ."•" 
By the Act of Quebec42, the Crown did not alter the common law of 
the Province43 but only modified the criminal law by replacing it with the 
principles of English law44. Commercial law, except for a few minor 
modifications, was to remain substantially the same as under the French 
régime45 : as a consequence, one can conclude on matters of principle that 
the Crown did not intend to extend to the colony the application of the 
Bubble Act. Even in the eighteenth century, legal opinion favoured the 
view that the statute was only of local application and did not encompass 
the whole of the Empire46. 
The jurisprudence of our Province confirms this opinion. In an early 
case that has never been cited on this issue, White & al. v. The Ship 
Daedalus41, the Court examined the point and set out the reasons why, in 
its opinion, the Bubble Act could not apply to the colony48. Sir William 
41. Commentaries on the laws of England, vol. I. 15th ed.. Cadeil & Davies. London. 
1809, at pp. 107-108. This principle is still admitted today: O. Hood PHILLIPS, Con-
stitutional and administrative law. 5th ed.. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1973. at 
pp. 590-591. 
42. (1774) 14 Geo. IN c. 83 (U.K.). 
43. Ibid., article 8. 
44. Ibid.. article 11: NEATBY, op. cit., at pp. 298 and following. Note however that only 
the criminal law of general application extended to the colony and not offences that 
were of a purely local nature in England: Isaac Rouss., Ex parte (1828) Stu. R. 321 
(K.B.). 
45. NEATBY. op. cit., at pp. 44. 50. 54, 208 and 212. "Not one change of the slightest 
importance was made in substantive commercial law throughout the entire period": 
ibid.. at p. 54. 
46. Du Bois, op. cit., at p. 25 and p. 66, n. 139: Labrie and Palmer. "The Pre-
Confederation History of Corporations in Canada", in Studies in Canadian company 
law. vol. 1. Butterworths, Toronto, 1967, (J. S. Ziegel, ed.), at p. 37. Cf. Bank of 
Upper Canada v. Bethune (1835) 4 U.C.Q.B. (o.s.) 165 and 193 where Robinson. C. J.. 
was of the opinion that the simple Cession of the Colony to the English operated the 
extension of the Bubble Act to Canada. As established previously, this is contrary to 
the principles of constitutional law. Vide supra n. 41. 
47. Stuart's Reports 130. Judgment was rendered on the 11 December 1818 by Sir William 
Scott in the High Court of Admiralty (Division of Quebec). The case is a remarkable 
one for the period. 
48. This case deals with the first part of the Bubble Act: in articles 1-17 of the Act. 
regulations were set out to control maritime insurance (bottomry) and to create a 
monopoly in favour of the London and Royal Exchange Assurance Co. On this point: 
GOWER, op. cit,, at p. 29, n. 31; COOKE, op. cit,, at p. 121. In the White case, two 
merchants of Quebec had loaned money on a bottomry bond and were claiming pay-
ment from the ship's owner. The debtor refused to pay pleading that such a loan was 
contrary to the Bubble Act and the special privileges created in favour of the London 
Insurance Companies. Sir W. SCOTT pointed out that those privileges " . . . no doubt, 
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Scott rendered judgment: he put forward two reasons why he refused to 
apply the statute. His first argument was one of policy: the Bubble Act 
was "a statute for restraining certain unwarrantable extravagancies, pro-
jects and schemes, or as they were called in the language of the times, 
bubbles, and for protecting owners of ships from exorbitant and fraudu-
lent insurances . . ."49. The statute was enacted to correct multiple frauds 
brought about by the abuses of bubble companies—but such a situation 
never arose in Canada. For this reason, the learned judge concluded: 
". . . it is perfectly clear that such an act could not apply to America. There 
were no existing circumstances at that time to render it necessary to erect such 
corporations in that part of the world . . . if then, its policy did not extend to 
America, so neither did its prohibitions . . ."so. 
Any other conclusion would be harmful to the economy of the colony 
where "capital in surely infinitely more scarce . . . than in Great 
Britain . . ."SOa. 
His Lordship's other argument was more technical: if truly the Bub-
ble Act was applicable to all the colonies, why was it necessary to extend 
its application by specific legislation in 1741 to the New England col-
onies51? A possible inference is that the Imperial Parliament itself consid-
ered it inapplicable to such dominions without clear extension thereto. 
The court then came to the conclusion that the statute did not apply in 
Quebec, a position that conforms to the constitutional principles ex-
amined above". 
Notwithstanding, some commentators argue that if the Bubble Act 
was not extended in its application to Quebec by the simple Cession of 
1763, then it must have been by the Act of 174154. However, when one 
examines the statute more closely, it becomes apparent that it was in-
in England, had full and entire operation . . ." (supra n. 47, at p. 131), and then went 
on to consider whether or not the Bubble Act applied to Canada. His conclusions, 
however, are of a more general nature and deal with the application of the whole 
statute, which includes article 18, regulating the existence of bubble companies. For 
bottomry bonds in civil law, vide articles 2693-2711 C.c. 
49. Supra n. 47, at p. 131. 
50. Ibid., ax p. 132. 
50a Ibid. 
51. His Lordship refers to the Act (1741) 14 Geo. II c. 37: ibid., at p. 132. This statute is 
examined infra. 
52. Ibid., at p. 132; supra n. 41. 
53. "An act for restraining and preventing several unwarrantable schemes and undertak-
ings in His Majesty's Colonies and Plantations in America." 
54. R. C. B. Risk, The nineteenth century foundations of the business corporation in 
Ontario (1973) 23 U. of T.L.J. 270, at p. 300, n. 175; Labrie and Palmer, op. cit., at 
p. 37. 
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tended, in its application, for the New England Colonies only and not for 
the whole empire, as is commonly assumed55. In 1740, promoters in Mas-
sachusetts were desirous of founding specialized banks: some doubt arose 
as to the validity of such schemes in view of the Bubble Act and the 
question was submitted to the Attorney-General of England for his opin-
ion. He saw no objections to these undertakings, adopting the view that 
the statute did not apply to the coloniesS6. A petition was then presented 
to Parliament to extend the application of the Bubble Act to the New 
England Colonies57 and the Act 14 Geo. II c. 37 was adopted. The formu-
lation of the statute indicates clearly that it was meant for that particular 
region of North America only58; this is even more apparent when one 
considers that in 1741 Quebec was still a French colony and was to remain 
one for nearly a quarter of a century. 
Consequently, unless the statute was made applicable to Quebec 
after the Cession59, it could not have brought about the application of the 
Bubble Act. 
In concluding, it is difficult to assert with complete certainty that the 
statute was not law in the province60 but when one considers the very 
55. Smith et Renaud, op. cit., vol. I, at p. 11. 
56. Vide supra n. 46. 
57. Du Bois, op. cit., p. 66. n. 141. 
58. Sir W. HOLDSWORTH, A history of English Law, vol. II, Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, 
1937. at p. 88. 
59. Vide supra n. 41. 
60. This difficult question becomes even more complicated when one considers that some 
authorities argue that the Bubble Act might have been imported into the Province at 
the same time as criminal law. The Act of Quebec replaced the French penal laws with 
English criminal law: supra n. 44. The question thus becomes: was the Bubble Act part 
of English criminal law at the time? Most authorities agree that the offence established 
by the Act was a public nuisance: the statute itself admits this (art. 18). Public nui-
sances in English law are part of the criminal law: commentators list amongst such 
offences the one created by the statute. On these points see: BLACKSTONE, op. cit., 
vol. Ill, at p. 216; vol. IV, at pp. 166-167; C. VINER, A general abridgement of law 
and equity, vol. 16. 2nd ed., G.G.J, and J. Robinson, London, 1792, at pp. 21-22; M. 
BACON, A new abridgement of the law, vol. 5, 7th ed., A. Straban, London, 1832, at 
pp. 794-95, 798; Rex v. Caywood 1 Stra. 472; 93 E.R. 641 (for what seems to be the 
only criminal prosecution reported under the Act); L.C.B. GOWER, A South Sea 
heresy? (1952) 68 L.Q.R. 214, at p. 220, n. 48. 
Blackstone describes contraventions to the statute as "heinous offences": op. cit., 
vol. IV, at pp. 115-117, where the author also gives details on the punishment im-
posed on offenders, praemunire. 
When English criminal law became part of Quebec law did this have the effect of 
introducing the Bubble Act to the province? In Bank of Upper Canada v. Bethune, 
supra n. 46, Robinson, C.J., suggests that this was possible but mentions this merely 
in obiter: ibid., at p. 171. Vide also J. CRÉMAZIE, Les lois criminelles anglaises 
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local nature of the legislation, the state of the Canadian economy at the 
period and the willingness of the English administration to leave intact the 
legal heritage of the colony, one can seriously doubt the view that admits 
the application of the statute to Quebec. 
2. Unincorporated joint-stock companies in Quebec 
As a rule, in England, after the South Sea Bubble, royal charters 
were not granted to commercial enterprises because of the unpopularity 
of such bodies: this, as established previously, was the main reason for 
the appearance of the unincorporated company as an adequate sub-
stitute61. In Canada, the Bubble Act probably did not apply. As a logical 
consequence, charters should have been granted for commercial purposes 
and, in principle, unincorporated companies should have been unknown 
in the law of the Province. This, however, was not so: the British ad-
ministration probably followed closely the Home government's policy in 
this matter and, as a rule, refused to grant letters-patent for commercial 
purposes62. This as a consequence would explain the appearance of unin-
corporated bodies in Quebec after the Cession. This point will now be 
examined. Article 1889 of the Quebec Civil Code reads as follows: 
"1889. Joint-stock companies are formed either under the authority of a royal 
charter, or of an act of the legislature, and are governed by its provisions; or they 
are formed without such authority, and in the latter case, are subject to the same 
general rules as partnerships under a collective name"6 3 . 
It is indeed surprising to find in the Civil Code a distinction estab-
lished between incorporated and unincorporated companies. However, 
traduites et compllées de Blackston,, Chitty . . . et telles que suivies en Canada, 
Frechette et Cie., Québec, 1842. at p. 63. This view however is a simplistic one. The 
whole of the English criminal law was not made applicable to the colony because some 
crimes were of a purely local nature in England: only the general principles of criminal 
law were adopted in the colony and the Quebec Court of Appeal admitted this point as 
early as 1828: Isaac Rousse, Exparte (1828) Stu. R. 321 (K.B.). One can argue on this 
issue that the offence created by the Bubble Act was only to apply locally to England 
because it is only there that the problems arose. There were no similar frauds in 
Canada at the time, and as pointed out by Sir W. Scott in the White case, supra n. 47, if 
the policy of the statute did not apply to Canada, then the only conclusion is that 
neither did its prohibitions: ibid., at p. 132. 
61. Supra, p. 7. 
62. Y. CARON, « De l'action réciproque du droit civil et du common law dans le droit de 
compagnies de la Province de Québec » in Studies in Canadian company law, vol. 1, 
at p . 104. 
63. See also: Perrault v. Central Agency (1924) 37 Que. K.B. 305 at p. 308. The older 
Companies Acts of the province often made this same distinction: e.g., Companies Act 
(1920) 10 Geo. V c. 72 articles 5962a, 5963 and 5968. 
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when one turns to the Commissioners' Reports, the reason for this be-
comes apparent. The Commissioners, in drafting article 1889 C.c, refer-
red exclusively to English sources where the distinction is a valid one64: 
however, they indicated in their commentaries under this article that they 
doubted whether in fact any such companies had ever existed in 
Quebec6S. 
Most Quebec writers have accepted this proposition66 and the con-
sensus has been, for more than a century, that in fact unincorporated 
joint-stock companies were not to be found in the Province. 
When one considers that such companies existed in Upper-Canada67, 
this casts serious doubts on the generally accepted theory. Recent re-
search in economic history and even a handful of cases from our provin-
cial courts will give us clear examples of unincorporated joint-stock com-
panies formed in Quebec that were ultimately regulated by adequate pro-
vincial legislation. Contrary to the traditional views, it will appear that the 
distinction set out in article 1889 C.c. is not purely academic but histori-
cally and factually correct. 
a) Unincorporated joint-stock companies for the purposes of coloniza-
tion: 1791-1809 
As early as the late eighteenth century, unincorporated companies 
made their appearance in Quebec68: mostly used for purposes of coloniz-
ing land, they had all the main characteristics of their English counterpart. 
Thus, these companies had a capital that was divided into transfera-
ble shares69. A trustee was owner of the property of the company for the 
same practical reasons as in English law70. Also, the company was ad-
64. Sixth Repor,, vol. Ill: p. 31 of the Report and 130 of the Draft Code. The Commis-
sioners referred to: Collyer, Gow and Story. 
65. Ibid. Thus, they commented: « Il est douteux qu'il existe ici aucune société en 
opération sous la forme de sociétés par actions sans la sanction de l'autorité 
publique . . . » From the Report reproduced in C. de Lorimier, Bibliothèqee du Code 
Civil de la Province de Québec, vol. 15, Cadieux & Derome, Montréal, 1886, a t p . 156. 
Vide also: P.B. MIGNAULT, Le Droit civil canadien, vol. 8, Wilson & Lafleur. 
Montréal, 1909, at pp. 246-247. 
66. SMITH et R E N A U D , op. cit., vol. I at pp. 27 and 36; J. SMITH, Le statut juridique de 
l'administrateur et de l'officier au Québec (1973) 75 R. du N. 530 at p. 535. 
67. Risk, supra n. 54 at p. 300, n. 175. An illustration in the Ontario jurisprudence: Comer 
v. Thompson (1851) 4 U.C.Q.B. (o.s.) 256. 
68. G. F. M C G U I G A N , supra n. 26 at pp. 32 and 36. 
69. Ibid., at pp. 46-47, 50-51 and 55. 
70. Ibid., at pp. 51, 52-53 and 55. Vide also the following authorities: F. J. NUGAN. 
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ministered not by its members but by representatives chosen for this 
purpose71. 
The existence of such companies can be traced to many sources. The 
first and most obvious one is the great influence of English commercial 
practices imported into Quebec by the new English settlers. Such com-
panies were also known in New England72 and the arrival of the American 
Loyalists after the War of Independence must have increased their 
popularity73. Finally, even the civil law tradition ultimately helped the 
introduction of such companies to Quebec: businessmen, under the 
French rule, had been accustomed to the simplicity of the contrat de 
société and probably were very critical of the formalism of royal charters. 
Unincorporated companies offered the same flexibility as civil law part-
nerships without the burdensome procedure attached to petitions of in-
corporation74. 
b) The unincorporated joint-stock company before the courts 
Even in the jurisprudence of the Province one can find traces of the 
existence of unincorporated companies: cases on this type of association 
are rare75 but they are of great importance. Illustrations taken from judg-
ments reveal that the structure of the unincorporated company in Quebec 
was identical to its English model. Thus, in the case of Loranger v. 
Dorion76, the notes preceding the judgment contain important references 
to the constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated company, the Silver 
Plume Mining Company: this case is the most typical one and warrants 
closer examination. 
"Pre-Incorporation contracts", in Studies in Canadian company law, vol. 1, at 
pp. 204-205; C. FORTIN, The pre-incorporation trust, a victim of misconstruction? 
(1970) 30 R. du B. 78 at pp. 85 and 87. 
71. M C G U I G A N , op. cit., at pp. 46-47, 47-49 and 55. 
72. Ibid., at pp. 39-41. 
73. Ibid., at p. 46. 
74. Ibid., at pp. 36-37; vide also COOKE, op. cit., at p. 124. 
75. The only cases that the reports seem to yield are the following: Bruneau v. Fosbrooke 
(1851)2R.J.R.Q. 414 (S.C.);Regina v. St-Louss (I860) 10L.C.R. 34 (Q.B.)vPrévost v. 
Allaire (1861) 11 L.C.R. 293 (Q.B.); Loranger v. Dorion (1881) 4 L.N. 108 (S.C.) 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal at (1881) 4 L.N. 373 (Q.B.). Note that although the 
cases are rare, they are of some importance, having been decided in major part in the 
Appeal Court of the Province. See also, Labrie and Palmer, op. cit., at p . 51 for 
another example. 
76. Ibid. The company was also involved in Chrétien v. Crowley (1882) 2 D.C.A. 385 
(Q.B.). 
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The company was administered by a board of directors, among 
whom a president, vice-president and secretary were chosen: thus, the 
unincorporated company in Quebec had a traditional corporate adminis-
tration77. The board of directors also had the power to make by-laws78. 
The company had a share capital that was freely transferable: this is one 
of the great differences between the unincorporated company and the 
partnership of civil law79. Finally, the presence of the trustee as owner of 
the capital stock of the company80 and the person responsible for all 
transfers of shares81 indicates that such companies were similar to the 
unincorporated bodies that appeared in England after the Bubble Act. 
However, the English influence was to be checked by the Courts: 
common law institutions could not easily be integrated into the economy 
of civil law rules and for that reason the provincial courts constantly tried 
to force the unincorporated company into a civilian category. The few 
cases reported clearly show that every time the courts had to deal with the 
relationship of members of unincorporated companies inter se or with 
third parties, they considered them as members of ordinary civil law part-
nerships82 and refused to apply to them any special regimen. Thus, the civil 
law was to assimilate the unincorporated company and transform it into a 
creature of its own83. 
77. Ibid., at p. 109. See also: Prévost v. Allaire, supra n. 75 at pp. 310 and 313; Regina v. 
St-Louis, supra n. 75 at p. 35, and supra n. 71. 
78. Ibid., at p . 109. 
79. Loranger v. Dorion, ibid., at p. 109; Regina v. St-Louis, supra n. 75 at p. 35. 
80. In the Loranger case, all of the capital stock of the company was to be issued to a 
trustee who would be in charge of transfers: supra n. 75 at p. 109. This was clearly set 
out in article 22 of the constitution and by-laws of the company. See Du Bois, op. cit., 
at p. 222. Trustees are often used in early legislations, a fact that betrays the great 
influence of English law: Fortin, supra n. 70, at p. 91; Labrie and Palmer, op. cit., at 
pp. 53-54. Unincorporated companies in Quebec made use of the trustee as early as 
the late eighteenth century: vide M C G U I G A N , supra n. 70. Note, however, a major 
difference between Quebec law and that of England: in most English joint-stock 
companies, the association is administered often by a group of trustees rather than by a 
single one (supra n. 30) whereas in Quebec, it is rare to find in such companies more 
than one trustee. This was probably due to the primitive nature of most unincorpo-
rated companies in the province. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Bruneau v. Fosbrook,, supra n. 75 at p. 414; Regina v. St-Louis, ibid., at pp. 41-42; 
Prévost v. Allaire, ibid., at p. 301. Vide also H. ROCH et R. PARÉ, Traité de droit civil 
du Québec, vol. 13, Wilson & Lafleur, Montréal, 1952, at p. 451. 
83. The cases do not discuss the particular rules applicable to the trustee of unincorpo-
rated companies. Should he be governed by the rules of common law or should he be 
subjected to the principles of the Civil Code? Although there were no cases settling the 
question as far as the trustees of unincorporated companies were concerned, cases 
suggest constantly that the law of the Province does not know of rules of Equity or 
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This tendency in Quebec to relate particular rules of company law to 
the more general principles of civil law becomes more apparent when one 
examines the special legislation enacted to control this new form of com-
mercial association. 
c) The Legislator intervenes 
i) Information concerning unincorporated bodies 
In English law, the legality of unincorporated companies has always 
been open to some doubt84. In Quebec law, however, such companies are 
perfectly legal. Thus, article 1889 C.c. implicitly admits that « rien 
n'empêche . . . que les associés divisent leur capital en actions et sous-
crivent chacun un certain nombre d'actions . . . »85. However, when an 
unincorporated company is formed in Quebec, article 1889 C.c. declares 
that it is considered as a general partnership86; consequently, the liability 
of the members of such bodies is unlimited, as set out in articles 1854 and 
1865 C.c.87. Unincorporated companies, in theory, could still be formed 
under Quebec law but they would simply be considered as a species of 
partnership. 
Trust and that where one finds statutes that refer to such common law institutions all 
efforts must be made to try to understand such mechanisms according to civil law 
rules. Thus, the courts have refused to admit the principles of trust in the law of the 
Province: on this point, see the interesting discussion in The Corporaiion of the 
County ofDrummond v. The South Eastern Railway Co. (1878) 22 L.C.J. 25 (S.C.) at 
p. 32; (1879) 24 L.C.J. 276 (Q.B.) at pp. 284-285. For a modern restatement of this rule 
see: Laliberté v. Larue [1931] S.C.R. 7, at pp. 17-18. 
84. GOWER, op. cit., at p. 37; Risk, supra n. 54 at p. 300 n. 175; COOKE, op. cit., at 
pp. 106-109, 128. Vide also Du Bois. op. cit., at p. 236. Equity however did not 
hesitate to protect the members of such bodies: see Du Bois, op. cit., at pp. 227-228, 
where the author illustrates this proposition with an unreported case, Hollis v. Childe, 
that lasted 70 years. Vide also CARR, op. cit.. at p. 191. 
85. MIGNAULT, op. cit.. vol. 8 at pp. 246-247; F. LANGELIER, Cours de droit civil, vol. 6, 
Wilson et Lafleur, Montréal, 1911, at p. 62. ROCH et PARÉ, op. cit., at p. 451: V. E. 
MITCHELL, A treatise on the law relating to Canadian commercial corporations, 
Southam Press Ltd., Montréal, 1916, at pp. 23 and 83. 
86. 1889 C.c. reads, in fine, as follows: 
"Joint-stock companies . . . are formed without such authority, and in the latter case, 
are subject to the same general rules as partnerships under a collective name." 
This refers to general partnerships, dealt with in articles 1865-1869 C.c. Note that in 
French they are described as "sociétés en nom collectif which is the reason why 
article 1889 C.c. mentions collective as opposed to general partnerships: the latter is 
the correct appellation and the wording of article 1889 C.c. in the English version on 
this point is a mere variation. 
87. Vide, generally, supra n. 85. 
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The legality of such companies was also recognized as early as 1849: 
thus, by the Union statute of 12 Vict. c. 45, entitled An Act to facilitate 
actions against persons associated for commercial purposes and against 
unincorporated companies, members of such companies had to declare 
the composition of their association in order to allow for personal actions 
against them if the company should default88. This statute is the origin of 
the present Companies and Partnerships Declaraiion Act*.. The Act of 
1849 also equated the unincorporated company with an ordinary civil law 
partnership and the individual liability of the members of such bodies 
declared by the statute was to be confirmed by subsequent juris-
prudence90. 
Thus, the Act of 1849 reveals that unincorporated companies existed 
at that early period and that their legality was not doubted even then by 
the Legislator. It also illustrates the typical reaction of jurists in Quebec 
law when faced with common law institutions: by assimilating them to the 
rules of civil law, they have tried to preserve harmony in the legal system 
of the Province91. 
88. Article 5 of the Act declares that the word "société" includes the unincorporated 
company, and article 6 limits the application of the Act to Lower-Canada (Quebec). 
89. R.S.Q. 1964 c. 272, section II. The 1849 Act has had a long history. See: (1856) 19-20 
Vict. c. 52; (1859) 22 Vict. c. 4; (1860) C.S.L.-C. c. 65 and after the Confederation: 
(1885)48 Vict. c. 29; R.S.Q. 1888 art. 5635 and following; R.S.Q. 1909 art. 7437 and fol-
lowing; (1924) 14 Geo. V c . 62; R.S.Q. 1925 c. 224; R.S.Q. 1941 cc .27 7ntit it finally be-
came c. 272 of the R.S.Q. 1964. A similar obligation was imposed upon incorporated 
companies but they had to furnish information by virtue of a different statute: (1876) 40 
Vict. c. 15 am. by (1882) 45 Vict. c. 47. Companies which failed to file the necessary 
declarations were not as a consequence prevented from contracting validly nor were 
their charter powers destroyed: Lippes v. Tutt (1926) Que. K.B. 566, at pp. 574-575 
per Greenshields, J. Note that the consolidation of 1925 merged both statutes and the 
obligation was imposed on all bodies forming commercial associations: R.S.Q. 1925 
c. 224. See also: (1924) 14 Geo. V c. 62. An interesting analysis of the statute can be 
found in SMITH et RENAUD, op. cit.. vol. 3, at pp. 1714-1718. 
90. In Prévost v. Allaire, supra n. 75, Aylwin, J., reminds us that unincorporated com-
panies cannot carry on business without declaring their membership: ibid., at p. 319. 
The court also points out that in the case of such bodies, the liability of members is 
unlimited: per Mondelet, J., at pp. 322-323 and per curiaum at p. 324. The same rule 
prevailed in English law: COOKE, op. cit., at pp. 176-177; Du Bois, op. cit., at 
pp. 222-226. 
91. Vide supra n. 83. 
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ii) Quo warranto 
In 1849, the Legislator enacted the statute 12 Vict. c. 4192 which 
codified prerogative writs93 and inter alia, at article 8 of that Act, the 
rules concerning quo warranto94: from then on, any body assuming to act 
as a corporation was to be declared illegal95. One wonders if that particu-
lar section was intended to apply to unincorporated companies at the 
time. 
As established previously, unincorporated companies are perfectly 
legal in civil law96. They become illegal only when they contravene the 
rules of quo warranto, now set out in article 828 C.c.p. and more particu-
larly the first paragraph thereof: 
"828. The Attorney General may take action, according to the ordinary rules, 
to ask that the sanctions provided by law be imposed: 
1. when a person, association or group of persons are acting as a corporation 
without having been legally incorporated or recognized as such;. . ." 
What is meant, in our law, by the expression "acting as a corpora-
tion"? 
There is only one reported case from the Courts that has given any 
attention to this matter and that is Loranger v. Dorion91. That was a case 
dealing with an unincorporated company98 and the court decided that it 
92. The title of this statute was: "An Act to define the mode of proceeding before the 
Courts of Justice in Lower-Canada, in matters relating to the protection and regulation 
of corporate rights and Writs of Prerogative . . .". 
93. Ibid; F. W. WEGENAST, The law of Canadian companies, Burroughs & Co., Toronto, 
1931. at p. 87. 
94. The law was enacted to deal with cases where "any association shall act as a corpora-
tion without being legally incorporated . . ." ; WEGENAST, ibid. In old English law, quo 
warranto was the appropriate remedy in cases where persons pretended to act as a 
corporation when in fact they had never been legally constituted as such: J. GRANT, A 
practical treatise on the law of corporations, Butterworths. London, 1850, at pp. 41 
and 282. However, such remedy applied only to cases where public franchises where 
abused and the writ never issued in cases of private corporations: GRANT, op. cit., at 
pp. 282-283. In Quebec law, quo warranto issued in both cases, i.e., where persons 
pretended to act as a private or a public corporation: Loranger v. Dorion. supra, n. 75. 
See also: SMITH et RENAUD, op. cit., vol. 3, at pp. 1810-11. 1819-20. 
95. 12 Vict. c. 41 art. 8. Note that in English law, for an unincorporated body falsely to 
represent that it had been duly incorporated was a criminal offence at common law: 
CARR, op. cit., at p. 116 n. 2; also at p. 171. What exactly constituted acting as a 
corporation in English law was a doubtful question: Loranger v. Dorion, supra n. 75, 
at p. \09per Torrance, J.; supra n. 84, and authorities cited. 
96. Supra, pp. 350-351. 
97. (1881) 4 L.N. 108, 373. 
98. The Silver Plume Mining Company: see the discussion, supra, at pp. 348-349. 
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had in fact acted as a corporation, arguing that ". . .a society which 
arrogates to itself this character of independent personality does assume 
to act as a corporation . . . " " . However, the facts of the case indicate the 
true limits of this decision. The company possessed a seal100 and was 
administered by a board of directors who had the power of making 
by-laws101. It also had a capital divided into transferable shares102 but, 
above alll in its documents it styled and represented itself as a duly 
incorporated company, which in fact it was not103. Under the circums-
tances, the Court held that the company was acttng iilegally as a cor-
poration104. 
One can question whether the same conclusion would have been 
arrived at if the company had not made the representation that it was 
incorporated. In Quebec law, the possession of a corporate seal is of little 
importance105. Administration of a body by certain elected representa-
tives is not the exclusive privilege of corporations106 and nor is a freely 
transferable stock107. Thus, the company's misrepresentation seems to 
have been the ultimate factor that rendered, in Loranger v. Dorion108, the 
unincorporated company an illegal association109. If such representation 
had not been made, it is submitted that the company would not have fallen 
within the application of the quo warranto rules. 
Unincorporated companies in Quebec are perfectly legal associa-
tions, recognized by article 1889 C.c. It is only when they assume the 
character of independent personality, when they represent themselves as 
bodies corporate, that quo warranto proceedings may be initiated against 
them. 
The presence of unincorporated companies in a civil law jurisdiction 
betrays the considerable influence that English law exercised on our 
99. Torrance, J., at p. 109. 
100. Ibid. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Ibid. 
103. Ibid. Thus, article 1 of its constitution declared that the company in that case was a 
corporation. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Article 33 of the Companies Act; M. et P. MARTEL, Aspecss juridiquss de la compa-
gnie au Québec, vol. 1, Publications Les Affaires Inc., Montréal, 1972,atp. 1 3 1 ; C A R R , 
op. cit., at p. 55: "A body which possesses and uses a common seal is not necessarily 
a corporation . . . Cf. SMITH et RENAUD, op. cit., vol. 3, at p. 1819. 
106. E.g.: article 1871 and following of the Civil Code. 
107. Supra n. 85. 
108. Supra n. 75. 
109. Ibid., at p. 109; CARR, op. cit., at pp. 6, 28-29. 
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commercial institutions even before the adoption of a Companies Act"0. 
To this day, the Civil Code still refers at article 1889 C.c. to the possibility 
of creating such companies: although this would seem highly improbable 
if not impossible1", it remains a clear indication of the impact of the 
English presence on our system of laws. 
II. Enter the pre-incorporation trust 
Article 29 of the Companies Act reads in part as follows: 
"The company . . . shall forthwith become and be vested with all property and 
rights, moveable and immoveable, held for it up to the date of the letters-patent, 
under any trust created with a view to its incorporation . . . " 
In recent years, considerable discussion has centered on the origin 
and meaning of what one commentator has described as "the most enig-
matic piece of legislation . . . " " 2 to be found in our Companies Act. The 
first part of this discussion will deal with the historical origin of the sec-
tion before examining in the second part the application of the pre-
incorporation trust to promoters in the civil law of the Province. 
A. A "NEBULOUS" ORIGIN"3 
The unincorporated company, as established previously, centered on 
the trustee: even in Quebec, the unincorporated body made a timid ap-
pearance and its most striking feature there was the existence of a trustee 
in a civil law jurisdiction"4. One theory put forward to explain the origin 
of article 29 was that this section was intended as a purely transitory 
measure: when the first general incorporation statutes were adopted for 
the whole of Canada, some mechanism was necessary to allow unincor-
110. SMITH et R E N A U D , op. cit,. vo.. I at p. 36; SMITH, supra n. 66 et p. 535. 
111. The Securities Act prohibits trading in securities without being registered: articles 14 
and 16 of the Act. The Securities Commission would probably refuse to register an 
unincorporated company that desired to issue shares on the market. It is interesting to 
note that in the Loranger case, supra n. 75, the company had even obtained a quota-
tion on the Stock Exchange for its shares: it had not mentioned to the Board of the 
Stock Exchange that it was not incorporated. This does not appear in the report but 
details can be found in the Attorney-General's factum in the Court of Queen's Bench 
file n. 332 (18 June 1881) at pp. Ill and VIII. See also Chrétien v. Crowley, supra, 
n. 76 at p. 388. 
112. J. Smith, Duties and powers of promoters in the company law of the province of 
Quebec (1973-74) 76 R. du N. 207 and 269 at p. 271. 
113. C. FORTIN, The pre-incorporation trust: a victim of misconstruction? (1970) 30 R. du 
B. 78 at p. 83. 
114. Supra, pp. 347, 348 et 349. 
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porated bodies desirous of acquiring the benefit of legal personality to 
transfer their property to the newly formed companies"5. The owner of 
the unincorporated company's property was, at law, the trustee1"6, and it 
was from him that the property had to be transferred to the new company. 
This would explain the curious formulation of article 29 of the Act. This 
view has been accepted by the Ontario Legislature who subsequently 
repealed the section, treating it as a mere historical anomaly1"7. 
Serious doubts have arisen concerning the validity of this interpreta-
tion: Professor Fortin has conclusively shown that although the approach 
is an ingenious one, it is completely wrong. The first general incorpora-
tion statutes in Canada did not even contain a similar section''8: it is clear 
that the Legislator's intentions were not to facilitate a transition if in the 
first statutes no mention of a transition section is to be found1"9. 
Moreover, as Fortin argues, the trustee in an unincorporated company 
does not hold property "with a view to its incorporation"120 but for 
merely practical reasons'21. After an extensive review of the early incor-
poration Acts in England and Canada, Professor Fortin comes to the 
conclusion that legislation of the type of s. 29 was not intended as a 
transition mechanism but must have been enacted for other purposes'22. 
But then, for what other purposes? Professor Fortin suggests that 
article 29 of the Companies Act was set out in order to solve the difficult 
problem of pre-incorporation contracts in Quebec law123. However, he 
offers no authority for this proposition and bases his whole argument on 
pure conjecture. Thus, the author laments: 
115. F. J. NUGAN, "Pre-incorporation contracts" in Studies in Canadian company law. 
vol. 1, at pp. 204-205. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Interim Report of the Select Commtttee on Company Law (Lawrence Report). On-
tario, 1967 at p. 11, par. 1.5.4; SMITH, supra n. 112 at pp. 271-272. 
118. FORTIN, supra n. 113 at pp. 84-86. where the author shows that in England, for exam-
ple, the first registration statute did in fact contain clear transitory sections: (1844) 7-8 
Vict. c. 110 s. 25. However, in Canada the very first statutes of 1850 and 1864 
contained no such sections: ibid., at pp. 85-86. 88. The author refers to the following 
Acts of the United Parliament: (1850) 13-14 Vict. c. 28 and (1864) 27-28 Vict. c. 23. 
119. FORTIN, ibid., at p. 90. 
120. Ibid., at p. 89. 
121. Ibid. It is indisputable that unincorporated companies were formed because it was so 
difficult to obtain charters generally: supra, pp. 7-9. Consequently, the trustee of such 
bodies did not hold the company's property in the hope that one day it might become a 
corporation at law. Trustees held the property to simplify rules of procedure and not 
for this more doubtful purpose. Vide supra n. 31. 
122. FORTIN, supra n. 113 at p. 91. 
123. Ibid. 
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" . . . we have to rest our opinion as to the raison d'être of this section on 
probabilities concerning immediate or circumstantial causes which promoted and 
surrounded its adoption, as well on previously expressed opinions on the 
matter . . ."124. 
The jurisprudence of our Province, as will be seen later on, has 
accepted the view that s. 29 deals with a matter of promotion but it is 
important to stress the fact that no authority can be found establishing 
historically that the section was intended as such125. This problem will 
now be examined with more attention. 
The first Companies Act applicable to the Province after Confedera-
tion was enacted in 1868126. When one examines closely the various sec-
tions of the provincial Act, certain conclusions on the origin of s. 29 
become inevitable. Thus, s. 4 sets out the various details that must be 
included in the petition for incorporation. Inter alia, ss. 4(2) declares that 
the petition must set out the amount of capital subscribed by the petition-
ers, the payment made thereupon and the mode of payment. Ss. 4 (3) 
requires that at least 50% of the nominal capital be subscribed for and 
ss. 4 (4) declares that 10% of the subscribed capital must have been al-
ready paid in127. 
This information is contained in the petition for incorporation 
—evidently, at that point, the company is not in existence. Consequently, 
one wonders who will hold, until incorporation, the monies required to be 
paid upon the capital before a charter can be granted. Article 4 (5) of the 
same Act gives a clear answer to the question: 
"Such aggregate must have been paid in to the credit of the company, or of 
trustees therefor, and must be standing at such credit, in some chartered bank, or 
banks within the province, unless the object of the company is one requiring that 
it should own real estate, in which case not more than one half thereof may be 
taken as invested in real estate suitable to such object, duly held by trustees 
therefor . . . " 
Thus, trustees will hold the monies and the property of the company 
until its incorporation, when, as article 8 declares, the company will be-
124. Ibid., at p. 84. The only serious authority referred to by Fortin is Wegenast where the 
author agrees with Fortin's conclusions but does not discuss the question of the origin 
of the section at all: vide WEGENAST, op. cit., at p. 262. For another interesting 
speculation on the origin of the article: MARTEL, op. cit., vol. 1, at pp. 48-49. 
125. SMITH, supra n.l 12 at pp. 271-273, agrees with Fortin's views but does not add any-
thing new to the arguments put forward by the commentator. 
126. (1868)31 Vict. c. 25. 
127. Or at least 5% of the total nominal capital: ibid., ss. 4 (4). 
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come vested with such rights from the moment it receives its letters-
patent128. 
As a consequence, the origin of article 29 can be explained as fol-
lows: in the first general incorporation laws of our Province, before the 
letters-patent were granted to petitioners, certain requirements as to capi-
tal had to be met. One such requirement was that there had to be a 
minimal paid-up capital for the protection of investors generally129. The 
company not being in existence, such monies had to be held in trust until 
its incorporation, when it would automatically become vested with the 
property held for it by the trustees. 
The minimal capital requirement had a curious history: it was re-
peated in the consolidation of 1888130 but disappeared in 1907131 as a 
condition precedent to incorporation. However, although the requirement 
disappeared, the reference to the pre-incorporation trust remains to this 
day on the statute books, causing considerable perplexity132. 
There is very little jurisprudence on the statutory trustee charged 
with holding the minimal capital before the company's incorporation. 
There is however one interesting case dealing with the nature of his 
relationship to the promoters of a company. In Bonhomme v. Bickerdike 
128. Note that Professor FORTIN. supra n. 113 mentions at pp. 86-87 that the Union statute 
of 1864 contained a similar section and wonders, at p. 89, if this could be an explana-
tion as to the origin of the section. However, he does not discuss the possibility any 
further nor does he examine the provincial Act in this respect. 
129. As to the intention of the Legislature in enacting such requirements, vide infra n. 145. 
130. R.S.Q. 1888 s. 4698 (5) and 4705. 
131. S.Q. (1907) 7 Ed. VII c. 48. At that point, the requirement that a minimal paid-up 
capital be in existence before the issuance of the letters-patent disappeared, but some-
how the vesting provision remained on the statute books (S.Q. 1907 c. 48 s. 21). This 
was not such an absurdity as it may seem: in fact, article 6g of the 1907 statute declares 
that the petition for incorporation must set out " . . . the amount of stock . . . the 
manner in which the same has been paid, and is held for the company . . . " If this 
means, in fine, that the money of the pre-incorporation subscriptions might be held for 
the company by trustees thereof, then this justifies the mention at article 21 of the Act 
that on incorporation the company becomes vested with such property. Article 6g 
became article 6007 of R.S.Q. 1909, but the reference to "the manner in which . . . 
[the money] . . . is held for the company" disappeared finally in (1920) 10 Geo. V 
c. 72, art. 5962g. Thus, the existence of the pre-incorporation trustee from 1868 to 
1920 justified the vesting provision that is now reproduced in s. 29 of the Act. How-
ever, after 1920, s. 29 became a mere historical anomaly that should have been re-
moved from the Act. 
132. The jurisprudence of the Province, not taking into account the historical origin of this 
type of legislation, simply applied it, as we shall see, to a pre-incorporation contract 
situation: vide SMITH et R E N A U D , op. cit., vol. I at p. 87. 
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133
, the defendant was one of the trustees who held the minimal capital 
pending the future company's incorporation134. In the Court of Review, 
Cimon, J., held that trustees under the statute were not promoters of the 
company as such: on the contrary, they were merely mandataries of the 
promoters and it is on the latter that liability should be imposed when any 
damage is caused by the promotion of a company135. However, in that 
case, the Court held that defendant was actually a promoter: this was not 
due to the simple assumption of the quality of trustee, but because he had 
participated actively in the promotion of the company136. The defendant 
had controlled credit sales to the future company137, had allowed his 
name to be used in the prospectus, which he also corrected and read138, 
was a trustee of the company139 and generally acted as a promoter. The 
Court, stressing the point that the determination of the question whether 
any person is or is not a promoter is always a question of fact, held the 
defendant liable for a variety of damages140. 
The principle that can be derived from the case is an important one: a 
pre-incorporation trustee under the old statutes was not a promoter of the 
company but at best an agent of the promoters. He could become a 
promoter if he participated in the general administration of the promotion 
but this was not a necessary incident of his original quality. Thus, the 
pre-incorporation trustee, at the outset, was not considered as a promoter 
when the courts were called upon to decide this question. It was only later 
cases that viewed him as such, without taking into consideration the 
historical explanation of his mention in the statute books. 
133. (1900) 17 Que. S.C. 28 (C.R.). This case, in review, was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal on the 24 April 1900 (unreported). 
134. Ibid., at pp. 32, 38, 49-50 and note at p. 51: « Le défendeur avait donc assumé ce 
mandat, au nom de la compagnie, de déposer et détenir ces argents, comme un des 
trustees de celle-ci . . . » (per Cimon, J., in the C.R.). 
135. Ibid., at pp. 43-44. 
136. Ibid., at pp. 51, 52 and 54. 
137. Ibid., at p. 54. 
138. Ibid., at p. 46. 
139. Ibid., at pp. 49-50. 
140. Ibid., at pp. 57-58; J. H. GROSS, Company promoters, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 
1972, at p. 25. Thus a promoter, in Quebec law, can only be described as such if he 
carries on certain activities: an exhaustive definition is difficult to arrive at in such a 
case and a more general test, as suggested by this case, seems appropriate. On the 
definition of promoters generally in our Province vide SMITH, supra n. 112 at p. 210, 
referring to Federated Press Ltd. v. L. H. Archambault (1924) 30R.L.n.s. 220 (S.C). 
Note that in Quebec, one can still be a promoter of a company after its incorporation: 
Pépin v. Dufour (1925) 31 R.C.n.s. 446 (S.C.) at p. 449; GROSS, op. cit., at p. 68; also at 
pp. 30, 32, 56-59 on the question of establishing when a promotion actually stops. 
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Minimal capital requirements were not to disappear completely but 
their importance was to become secondary. Whereas, until 1907, such a 
requirement was a condition precedent to incorporation, after that period 
it became a mere condition to be fulfilled before the company could start 
its operations141 but was no impediment to the granting of a charter. 
Requirements of minimal capital disappeared completely from the Com-
panies Act in 1964142: statutory protection of creditors and shareholders 
in general then became unnecessary in view of the active protection af-
forded by the Securities Act and the Commission established there-
under143. Before that period, however, minimal capital requirements were 
141. After 1907. a minimal paid-up capital was necessary before the company could start 
operating but it nevertheless obtained its charter before that moment: S.Q. 1907 c. 48 s. 
18; R.S.Q. 1909 s. 6019; R.S.Q. 1925 c. 223 s. 23; R.S.Q. 1941 c. 276 s. 24. 
142. Ab. by S.Q. 1964 c. 59 s. 4. The minimal capital requirement gave rise to some in-
teresting jurisprudence in our Courts. Third parties were held to have constructive 
notice of this requirement: Bergeron v. La Cie. de meubles de Jonquière (1913) 22 
Que. K.B. 341, at p. 346. The statute imposed liability on the directors who allowed a 
company to carry on business before the requirement was met. This liability resulted 
from statute: Lefebvre v. Prouty (1918) 54 Que. S.C. 490 at p. 495-4%; Pérusse v. 
Fuller (1919) 55 Que. S.C. 254 (C.R.) at pp. 257-258: Phoenix Assuranee Co. Ltd. of 
London v. Lagueux (1932) 38 R.L.n.s. 474 (S.C.) at p. 495; on appeal at (1932) 53 Que. 
K.B. 398 at pp. 403 and 405; Latrellle Gaz Naturel Equipemett Co. Ltd. v. B.C.N. 
[1967] Que. Q.B. 259 at p. 26\;Caplan v. Alexis Nihon Co. Ltd. [1966] Que. Q.B. 377 
generally and more recently. Schlesingrr v. Employers' Liability Ass. Co. [1972] Que. 
C.A. 65. at p. 66. The liability might also result from the general principle of delict set 
out in article 1053 of the Civil Code: where a statute directs that a certain thing shall 
not be done, a delict is committed by him who acts in contravention thereof: Lagueux 
case, supra in (1932) 53 Que. K.B. 398 at p. 407. 
If the company commenced business before the requirement of the Act was met, it 
could have its charter forfeited: Grandbois v. Business Directory Services Ltd. (1924) 
62 Que. S.C. 213 at p. 214, 215-216; The Queen v. The Eastern Archipelago Co. (1853) 
118 E.R. 988, 994. Note, however, that the requirements were not so drastic as to 
include preliminary contracts indispensable to the formation of the company: Begin v. 
William Copping Lumber Co. (1923) 28 R.L.n.s. 399 (C.R.) at pp. 400-401. 
143. The Companies Act, in the earlier years of this century, contained a myriad of sections 
dealing with the protection of the capital of the company: with the advent of modern 
securities legislation in the province, these sections proved of little importance in 
contrast to the more active role played by the Securities Commission as protector of 
investors. On this point, see the penetrating discussion in In re Richeiieu Oil Ltd. 
[1950] Que. K.B. 714 at pp. 719-722. In England, surprisingly enough, minimal capital 
requirements have reappeared in the statute: GOWER, op. cit., at pp. 300-301. They 
were introduced by the Companies Act, 1900: Pennington, op. cit., at p. 255, and also at 
pp. 256-257. C M . SCHMITTHOFF and J.H. THOMPSON, Palmerss Company Law, 21st 
ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1968, at p. 184 n. 4 where the authors give a good resume 
of the legislation and the evils it sought to cure. Vide also Companies Act (1900) 63-64 
Vict. c. 48 (U.K.) s. 4 which became s. 47 of the Companies Act, 1948. In England, such 
provisions can be justified: the fact that investors cannot look to a Securities Commis-
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set out in the statute for the protection of the public: as pointed out by 
Archer, J., in the Superior Court decision of French Gas Saving Co. v. 
Desbarats144, the requirements of a minimal capital were instituted in 
order to protect the investing public against fraudulent promoters145. 
Thus, if trustees held monies and property for that purpose, can one argue 
that the pre-incorporation trust was intended as a promotion mechanism 
when jurisprudence tells us that its main purpose was to protect investors 
against scheming promoters? 
In final analysis, the origin of s. 29 can simply be explained by the 
fact that until 1907, the provincial Companies Act required that minimal 
capital be paid up and held by trustees as a condition precedent to incor-
poration146. When that condition was abolished in 1907, article 29 of the 
Act should have been amended in consequence: the failure to do so was to 
cause a great deal of confusion and disputation among the legal commen-
tators of the Province. 
B. THE PRE-INCORPORATION TRUST IN CIVIL LAW 
The courts of the Province, more than eager to find some adequate 
solution to the problems of pre-incorporation contracts, gladly seized 
upon s. 29 of the Act and turned it into a promotional device147. A great 
sion for adequate surveillance of company promoters generally explains the necessity of 
such statutory safeguards. 
144. [1912] 1 D.L.R. 136 (K.B.). 
145. Ibid., at p. 146. Such legislation was enacted for the protection of the public against 
the fraud of promoters: MITCHELL, op. cit., at pp. 268 and 319; TASCHEREAU, J., in 
Dominion Salvage & Wrecking Co. Ltd. v. The Attorney-General of Canada (1892-93) 
21 S.C.R. 72 at pp. 89-90 referring to The Eastern Archipelago case, supra n. 142; G. 
H. EVANS Jr., British Corporation Finance 1775-1850, The eohn Hopkins Presss Bal-
timore, 1936, at p. 100. 
146. The use of a trustee to hold monies for the company to be incorporated somehow 
subsisted in commercial practices in the Province. Thus, in the recent case of Latreille 
Gaz Naturel Equipement Cie Ltée v. B.C.N. & Lalonde [1967] Que. Q.B. 259, L. held 
money for the plaintiff company in an account with the defendant bank: this account 
was "in trust" for the future company. However, in this instance, such trust did not 
refer to that mentioned in s. 29 of the Companies Act. "In trust" bank accounts are 
now quite familiar in Quebec law, where they have generated endless controversies in 
the courts and the textbooks as to their meaning in a civil law context. For an illuminât-. 
ing exposition of this complicated problem, vide: RENAUD et SMITH, op. cit., vol. 2, at 
pp. 799-814. Note that in the aforementioned case, at p. 261, the Court held that such a 
trust—if it existed—would, under the circumstances of the case, justify an accounting 
on the defendant's part. This squares with the rule of 981 / C.c, imposing upon the 
trustees of civil law a duty to account to the beneficiaries. 
147. Smith, supra n. 112 at p. 273. 
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number of cases have appeared of late148 dealing with that particular piece 
of legislation in the context of pre-incorporation contracts without inquir-
ing as to the historical validity of this process. In a sense, this approach 
has been beneficial and it can be argued that the error of historical in-
terpretation was ultimately useful in this field. 
As a promotional technique, the pre-incorporation trust has proven 
to be of some value: from the taxation point of view, it presents un-
doubted advantages149 while offering at the same time a comprehensive 
solution to the problems of pre-incorporation contracts and the duties of 
promoters in the province of Quebec. Before examining these various 
points, some considerations on the nature of such trusts in civil law have 
to be set out. 
1. The pre-incorporation trust: a question of interpretation 
The statutory trust enacted by s. 29 of the Act presents a major 
problem of interpretation: should it be governed by the principles of civil 
law trusts150 or should English law apply? 
One school of thought argues for English law151. The main basis for 
this position is an historical one: the pre-incorporation trust appeared as 
early as 1868 in our provincial laws152 whereas the civil law trust appeared 
only in 1879153. Consequently, English law must have applied at the time 
and should still be referred to in cases falling under s. 291S4. 
This view has been severely criticized. Professor Smith has conclu-
sively shown that even prior to 1879, trusts in Quebec law were inter-
preted according to civil law principles155 and that even after that period, 
148. Ibid., at p. 273 n. 93. 
149. W. M. FRIEDMAN, The New Tax Act and the transfer to a corporaiion of assets 
acquired pending incorporation (1973) 33 R. du B. 17 at pp. 25-26; FORTIN, supra 
n. 113 at pp. 100-101 and D. SOHMER, The closely held corporaiion in 1972 jurispru-
dence (1973) 33 R. du B. 122 at p. 132 n. 25 for other aspects of tax rebates possible 
with the use of pre-incorporation trusts. 
150. 981a C.c. and following. Generally, on this very controversial subject, vide P. E. 
GRAHAM, Some pecuiiarities of trusts in Quebec (1962) 22 R. du B. 137; A. J. 
M C C L E A N , The common law and the Quebec trusts — some comparisoss (1967) 
U.B.C.L. Rev.-C. de D. 333. 
151. MARTEL, op. cit., vol. I at p. 47-48; SOHMER, supra n. 149 at p . 131 n. 32 where the 
author refers to G. W. KEETON, Law of trusts, 9th ed., Pitman, London, 1968,atp. 17. 
152. Supra, pp. 356-357. 
153. (1879) 42-43 Vict. c. 29. 
154. Supra n. 151. 
155. Smith, supra n. 112 at pp. 273-274. 
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the Courts have always refused to import English law on this subject156. 
Recent research confirms and strengthens Smith's views157. 
After settling this issue, the learned author then concludes: 
"The meaning of the word "trust" used in section 29 of the Companies Act, 
therefore, relates to a civil law concept. It is merely a label given to a legal 
relationship recognized by the law of Quebec . . ."'58. 
This is where Professor Smith's reasoning becomes more difficult to 
follow. Smith argues that although the trust should be understood accord-
ing to civil law, he does not establish what category of that law should 
apply. This question is an essential one: the nature of the trust created 
under s. 29 of the Act must be ascertained in order to allow for the 
imposition of rights and duties on the trustee and to establish the general 
rights of the company towards the latter159. 
There is no jurisprudence on this exact point but the following case is 
of great help in dealing with this problem. In Laliberté v. Larue160, Rin-
fret, J., was discussing the nature of statutory trusts in the law of Que-
bec161: the learned judge was of the opinion that such trusts must be under-
stood according to the rules of civil law162 and more particularly the rules 
of Trusts as set out in the Civil Code of the Province: 
« . . . II est impossible de ne pas voir l'analogie entre ces articles du code et le 
statut que nous étudions. Il est naturel et logique que nous en tenions 
compte . . ." ,63. 
The Laliberté case yields a precious tool of legislative interpretation 
in that the Supreme Court suggests that whenever the statute books of the 
Province refer to the concept of trust, such concept must be understood 
according to the private law of the Province as codified in the Civil Code. 
Thus, it is submitted, the rules of civil law must be resorted to in the case 
of the statutory trust under s. 29 of the Act: on the basis of the analogy 
156. Ibid., referring to Laliberté v. Larue [1931] S.C.R. 7 at p. 18. 
157. D. N. METTARLIN, The Quebec trust and the civil law (1975) 21 McGill L.J. 175 at 
pp. 203-206. 
158. Smith, supra n. 112 at p. 275. 
159. Komery v. Restaurant Komery Inc. [1965] Que. Q.B. 853, at p. 856. 
160. Supra n. 156. 
161. The case dealt with the meaning of the trust created under the Special Corporate 
Powers Act R.S.Q. 1964 c. 275 s. 22 and following. 
162. Supra n. 156 at p. 18. 
163. Supra n. 156 at pp. 20-21. Rinfret, J., refers to O'Meara v. Bennett reported at [1922] 
A.C. 80 (P.C.) at p. 85. The trust analogy has also been suggested by the provincial 
Court of Appeal in Yuksel Atillasoy v. Crown Trust Co. [1974] Que. C.A. 442 at 
pp. 449, 451 but note that this was not a case of a statutory trust but a contractual one. 
See also, infra n. 258. 
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suggested by Rinfret, J., in the Laliberté case, the trust of s. 29 should be 
analysed according to the rules set out in the chapter Of Trusts in the Civil 
Code, whenever applicable. This should solve theoretically the problem 
of imposing duties on promoters in Quebec who organize corporate 
promotion by way of trust deeds under s. 29 of the Act164. 
2. The pre-incorporation trust: creation 
Before the chapter on Trusts was inserted in the Civil Code in 
1879165, it was possible to create a trust fora company not yet in existence 
if there were trustees to hold the rights established under such a trust for 
the future company. In Desrivières v. Richardson166, a legacy to trustees 
of a future corporation was being questioned as to its validity and Kerr, 
J., in the provincial Court of Appeal, confirmed the legality of such a 
trust: 
" . . . f o r though it is admitted that a legacy is lapsed . . . when left to an indi-
vidual, or to a body politic or corporate, not in esse, yet the principle does not 
apply to this case, inasmuch as the trustees were all alive when the testator made 
his will, and they received the bequest for the benefit of the Royal Institution so 
soon as it should please the Provincial government to give to 'airy nothing a local 
habitation and a name . . .' " , 6 7 . 
This practice was taken from old English law168 and its validity was 
to be once again confirmed by the courts half a century later169. It would 
seem, however, that since 1879 this method is no longer possible: if a 
bequest is to be made to a corporation not in esse, the only way this can 
be done is under article 981a C.c, which sets out the conditions for 
creating a trust in civil law170. Alternatively, a trust could be set up under 
s. 29 of the Companies Act and it is the requirements of form necessary 
under that statute that will now be examined. 
164. The problem of promoters' duties in Quebec law remains unresolved to this day: 
SMITH, supra n. 112 at pp. 212 and 288. But see infra, pp. 372-373-381. 
165. Supra n. 153. 
166. [1826] Stu. K.B. 218 (Prov. C.A.), 224 (K.B.). 
167. Ibid., at p. 241. 
168. Ibid. Note, however, that English law now refuses to admit the validity of a pre-
incorporation trust: MARTEL, op. cit., vol. I at p. 48; GROSS, op. cit., at pp. 72-75 and 
pp. 77-78, 79 and more precisely at p. 86, where the author points to the "reasonable 
parallel" between the unborn child and the company prior to its incorporation; P. D. 
MCKENZIE, The legal status of the unborn company (1972-73) 5 N.Z.U.L.R. 211. 
American law recognizes the validity of such trusts: GROSS, op. cit., at pp. 78-79. See 
also: FORTIN, supra n. 113 at p. 82. 
169. Abbott v. Fraser (1874) 20 L.C.J. 197 (P.C.) at p. 2\6per Sir Montague Smith, quoting 
with approval the Desrivières case, supra n. 166. 
170. The trust of article 981a C.c. is subjected to various conditions of form: if it is a 
donation, it must be in notarial form (776 C.c). As for trusts established by will, see 
art. 840 C.c. and following. 
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Section 29 does not give any indication as to the particular procedure 
that is necessary to create a trust thereunder: as a consequence, it is 
necessary to examine the requirements set out in the provincial jurispru-
dence and the commentators on this point. 
The existence of a trust under s. 29 is a question of fact: the Courts 
have refused to infer from the conduct of the parties a trust in the name of 
a future company unless clear evidence that a trust had in fact been created 
is adduced171. Thus, in St. Lawrence Clothing Manufacturing Co. of 
Quebec Ltd. v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd. of London172, the declaration 
by a promoter that ". . .he was making the purchase for the account of a 
company about to be incorporated . . ,"173 was insufficient in the Court's 
opinion to bind the company174. It was the Supreme Court of Canada's 
decision in Provincial Hardwoods Inc. v. Morin & Al.isS that shed some 
light on this question. Fauteux, J., held that in order to prove the creation 
of a trust under s. 29 one had to establish the existence of a trustee who 
was acting for the benefit of a future company: 
« Il est de l'essence d'un fidéicommis qu'un titre légal à des biens passe d'une 
personne à un fiduciaire qui le détient pour l'avantage du bénéficiaire du 
fidéicommis »176. 
Subsequent provincial cases on this issue followed the Morin princi-
ple and required that a very clear intention of acting as a trustee for the 
future company be proven before a trust under s. 29 was established: in 
Hewlings v. Mirotchick177 a simple written declaration that one intended 
to act as a trustee was deemed insufficient by the Court178. 
171. Komery v. Restaurant Komery Inc. [1965] Que. Q.B. 853,per Brossard, J., at p. 857. 
Also per curiam, at p. 854. 
172. [1943] Que. S.C. 144. 
173. Ibid., at p. 146, per Gibsone, J. In that case, it was established that such a declaration 
was made only once, although it was "sa id" that it was made in other cases: ibid. 
174. Ibid., at p . 148. Thus, the case is authority for the proposition that a simple passing 
reference will not constitute a trust under s. 29. However, other views on this case 
have been put forward and will be discussed later on: infra, pp. 368 and following. 
175. [1966] S.C.R. 58. 
176. Ibid., at p. 67. Also at p. 66. S M I T H , supra n. 112 gives an interesting analysis of the 
case at pp. 275-277', and more particularly at p. 276 n. 104 for a minor criticism of 
Fauteux, J.'s use of the expression « titre légal ». See also: GRAHAM, supra n. 150 at 
p. 142. 
177. [1972] R.P. 22 (P.C.). 
178. Per Gold, J., at p. 25, referring to the Morin case, supra n. 175. In the Hewlings case, 
perhaps if the promoter had declared expressly that he was acting as a trustee under 
article 29 of the Companies Act, the judgment could have been different. See also the 
recent decision of the Superior Court: Guillemet v. Brazeau [1973] Que. S.C. 953 at 
pp. 957-958, also referring to the Morin case. 
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There are several ways whereby one might be capable of establishing 
such an intention. In the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in 
Giguère v. Bourque119, two promoters G. and V. prepared a written con-
tract setting out that they intended to act as trustees for the future cor-
poration180: this agreement was sufficient according to the Court to create 
a trust under s. 29 and the company was held bound by the contracts 
subsequently entered into by its representatives181. The Court of Appeal, 
in another case182, suggested that the memorandum of association183 
might also be used to create a pre-incorporation trust indicating that if the 
intention of acting as trustee can be readily ascertained from a document 
then a valid trust under s. 29 will be created. 
Another interesting approach is that proposed by Friedman184. The 
author suggests that the trustee should register under the Companies and 
Partnerships Declaration ActS85: such registration is useful because of the 
publicity it gives to the creation of the trust186. 
S. 29 of the Companies Act, as interpreted by our Courts, creates a 
law of exception. Trusts, as we know them, are to be found only in the 
Civil Code187 and declarations of trust in civil law are simply unknown188: 
because s. 29 creates an exception to these two rules, courts have refused 
to interpret it liberally and will recognize a trust under s. 29 only when a 
clear intention of acting as a trustee for the future company has been 
established189. This restrictive view is ultimately for the protection of the 
company: if the company is to be bound in futurum by mere declarations 
of intention, this could prove of serious consequence for the future 
shareholders and creditors of the company190. 
179. [1973] Que. C.A. 663. 
180. Ibid., at p. 664: «. . . en vertu d'un contrat de fidéicommis . . . ». 
181. Ibid., at p. 667, per curiam. 
182. Komery v. Restaurant Komery Inc,, supra n. 171. 
183. Ibid., at p. 857 per Brossard, J. The procedure of a memorandum of association was of 
course taken from English law: Bergeron v. La Compagnee de meubles de Jonquière 
(1913) 22 Que. K.B. 341 at p. 345. 
184. Supra n. 149. 
185. Companies and Partnerships Declaration Act R.S.Q. 1964 c. 272. Friedman, ibid., at 
p. 24; the author suggests registration under s. 10 of the Act as "Sole Proprietor In 
Trust for a Corporation to be formed". 
186. Ibid., at p . 25. 
187. 981a C.c. and following. 
188. FORTIN, supra n. 113 at p. 91 n. 56 and p. 92. O'Meara v. Bennett [1922] A.C. 80 
(P.C.); RENAUD et S M I T H , op. cit,, vo.. 2 at p. 807. 
189. Vide supra n. 171. 
190. The Court of Appeal has indicated in the Komery case, supra n. 171 that one of the 
main interests in establishing the nature of the relationship between a company and its 
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The majority of cases have thus taken a cautious approach to the 
pre-incorporation trust: there are, however, a few discordant views on 
this subject. 
There is a curious body of jurisprudence that has taken the view that 
s. 29 applies to every case where the company purported to act before its 
incorporation191. The fact that the company is not in existence is de-
scribed in one case as a purely "grammatical" nuance that should not 
prevent the imposition of obligations on the company192. Such views are 
open to serious criticism: surely if the Act mentions expressly a trust 
created with a view to incorporation, that must mean that some form of 
trust must at least exist before s. 29 comes into application. The reason-
ing of such cases is perhaps convincing from the point of view of equitable 
considerations, but it fails to take into account the nature of the corporate 
personality, the formulation of the Companies Act and the principles of 
law governing the relationship of promoters to the company in our Pro-
vince193. For these reasons, this minority view should be definitely set 
aside. The pre-incorporation trust, as a creature of jurisprudence, must 
meet with certain strict requirements and the most common leitmotif'to be 
found in this context is clear proof of the intention of creating such a trust. 
This is best provided for in writing although oral evidence would in 
principle suffice if admissible194 
3. The pre-incorporation trust: an exception to the rule in Keiner v. 
Baxter195 
In Quebec, a company that is not in existence cannot as a conse-
quence have any representatives: a civil law mandate cannot be created 
promoters is the protection of third parties and creditors: ibid., per Brossard, J., at 
p. 856. Vide also GROSS, op. cit., pp. 172-173. 
191. 5/. Jovite Wood Products Inc. v. P. et L. Potvin & Cie. [1962] Que. Q.B. 856 at p. 856 
per Rinfret, J., diss. Note that the majority of the Court dealt with another question 
and Rinfret, J.'s view is merely obiter. Kotnery v. Restaurant Komery Inc., supra 
n. 171 at p. 861 per Rinfret, J., dissenting again; Gauvin v. Langelier [1963] Que. Q.B. 
206 at p. 207 per Choquette, J., where the judge based his decision on a partnership 
contract that he understood to be a trust under s. 29 although no mention of such trust 
was made in the contract. 
192. Per Rinfret, J., in the Komery case, ibid, at p. 861. 
193. SMITH, supra n. 112, has clearly shown that pre-incorporation activities will not bind 
the company unless some legal mechanism is invoked to justify this: see, generally, 
p. 217 and following. 
194. The problem with oral statements is that they cannot vary the terms of a written 
contract: 1234 C.c. 
195. (1866) L.R. 2 C.P. 174. 
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where there is no principal196, and therefore, promoters cannot as agents 
bind the company before incorporation. Courts have applied this rule by 
invoking principles of civil law197 but the majority of cases suggests that 
this is a mere duplication of the Keiner v. Baxter principle198 and the 
latest authorities agree on this proposition199. 
Professor Smith's research has established, however, that the civil 
law offers in this context more protection to third parties than the com-
mon law200. The author has shown that a variety of mechanisms are availa-
ble in civil law that allow for the imposition of liability on the company for 
pre-incorporation agreements. The rules of delegation201, stipulation for 
the benefit of a third person202, the conditional contract203, the theory of 
adoption of contractual liability204 and finally the rules of quasi-
contract205, all serve the purpose of creating legal relationships with the 
company and a third party, once the company comes into existence. 
The pre-incorporation trust is also considered as an available 
mechanism to that end by the learned author206: however, the consid-
erable restriction imposed on the effect of the pre-incorporation trust by 
Smith's interpretation of s. 29 is so drastic that it warrants closer exami-
nation. The author argues that the company, on being incorporated, is not 
automatically bound by a contract made in its name by a trustee under 
s. 29: it must indicate its willingness to accept such contract and, as a 
196. SMITH, supra n. 112 at p. 219. Anyone assuming the quality of mandatary in civil law 
where no mandator exists becomes personally liable on the contract: SMITH, ibid., at 
pp. 214-216 discusses this point. See also: Pearson v. Lighthall (1895) 7 Que. S.C. 201 
at p. 202; articles 1715-16 C.c. 
197. SMITH, ibid., at p. 219. 
198. SOHMER, supra n. 149 at p. 130 n. 32. See also: Chinic v. The Canada Steel Co. (1876) 
3 Q.L.R. 1 (C.R.) at p. 3; Gadbois v. Montreal Exhibition Co. Ltd. (1930) 36 R. de J. 
478 (S.C.) at pp. 483-484. 
199. Guillemet v. Brazeau [1973] Que. S.C. 953 at pp. 956-957, 958, and authorities therein 
referred to; Dame Maria Klein-Schwartz v. Paul Powell et Empire Ethnic Pageantry 
[1976] C. P. 24. 
200. SMITH, supra n. 112 at p. 219. 
201. Ibid., at pp. 219-221. For a recent case where perfect delegation was invoked with 
success, see Chapuis v. Banque canadienne impériale de commerce [1975] C.A. 691. 
202. Ibid., at pp. 221-222. Note that in English law, such stipulations do not exist. Thus, 
Gross points out that ihe jus quaesttum tertio is unknown to common law: GROSS, op. 
cit., at p. 184. 
203. Ibid., at pp. 222-224. 
204. Ibid., at pp. 224-226. See also: De Bellefeuille v. La Municipalité du Village de St-
Louis du Mile End (1880) 4 L.N. 42 (S.C.) at p. 44. 
205. Ibid., at pp. 226-235 for a brilliant analysis of the application of the doctrines of unjust 
enrichment and negotiorum gestio in the field of pre-incorporation contracts. 
206. Ibid., at pp. 270-280. 
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consequence, can also repudiate it207. This extraordinary view of s. 29 is 
based on a reading of St. Lawrence Clothing Manufacturing Co. of 
Quebec Ltd. v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd. of London20* and Perrault's 
opinion of the case209. In view of the fact that it contradicts the express 
terms of s. 29 and that it renders the statutory trust completely useless in 
a pre-incorporation context210, such an interpretation must be ap-
proached with some degree of scepticism. The case referred to by both 
authors is an old one and never actually refers to s. 29 2 " . Moreover, the 
facts of the case do not justify the traditional views expressed on it. D. 
and L. wished to form a company and for that purpose approached legal 
advisers who commenced the necessary procedures. Meanwhile, D. was 
carrying on business in his own name: in January 1939, he purchased 
certain goods that were used exclusively for the purposes of his own 
business. In one case only D. declared that he was making purchases for 
the account of a company to be incorporated212. At the same time an 
insurance was taken on the goods bought by D. in January in the name of 
the future company213 Letters-patent were issued on the 17 February 
and the next day fire destroyed D 's premises with all the goods therein 
purchased during January The insurance company refused the 
company's claim that it had an insurable interest and this was upheld by 
Gibsone J in the Superior Court: 
". . . in the opinion of this Court the purchase by Dorfman of the said merchan-
dise as above related in January 1939. namely the purchase being made in his 
own name, and the merchandise shipped and delivered to him at his address. 
constitutes the said Dorfman the owner of such merchandise, and the fact that he 
may have mentioned to the sellers that his intention was that this merchandise 
should go to a company which was to be formed did not affect the acquisition of 
ownership by D. personally . . ."2"'. 
D. acquired the property in his own name and he alone had an insur-
able interest therein: the company that came in existence in February 
could not claim any rights. This essentially is what the Court decided. 
The contention that it also decided that under a pre-incorporation 
trust the company must manifest its intention of accepting goods bought 
for it before its existence is not justified by the facts of this case nor by 
207. Ibid., at pp. 277-280. 
208. [1943] Que. S.C. 144. 
209. A. PERRAULT, La Critique des Arrêts (1943) 3 R. du B. 345. 
210. SMITH, supra n. 112 at p. 280, where the author comments that ". . . the far-reaching 
implications of the wording used in this statute have been reduced to nothing . . . " 
211. SMITH, ibid., at p. 277. 
212. [1943] Que. S.C. 144, at p. 146. 
213. SMITH, supra n. 112 at pp. 277-278. 
214. [1943] Que. S.C. 144, at p. 148. 
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any dicta of Gibsone, J.215. When the company was formed, D. was not 
even a member of it: the lawyers in charge of the incorporation proce-
dures were to remain directors until April 1939216, and it is only at that 
point that D. joined the company. However, the controversy surrounding 
this question now seems to have been settled definitely by the Court of 
Appeal's recent decision in Giguere v. Bourque217. The Court held that 
the effect of s. 29 is an immediate one: where the company is incorpo-
rated, it becomes immediately vested with any contractual right that is 
held for it by a trustee218. In that case, trustees for the future company 
had entered into a lease with a third party for the benefit of the future 
company: once incorporated, the company immediately became vested 
with the rights resulting from the lease218 and an action in nullity thereof 
for fraud had to be taken not by the trustee but by the company which had 
become, under the terms ofthat contract, the actual lessee219. Similarly, 
the Court of Appeal held that the company was bound by a promise of 
sale made to the trustees220: an action in nullity thereof had to be taken by 
the company, which was now a party to the contract made in its name. 
Thus, the Court of Appeal has taken the view that a trust under s. 29 has 
an immediate effect: it had already suggested in various dicta21x such an 
interpretation that conforms to the wording of the statute. 
215. As pointed out above, at p. 41, the case decided that the promoter had to establish 
clearly his intention to act as a trustee under s. 29. Nowhere does the case report 
suggest that the company also has to affirm its intention of being bound by the trustee's 
contract. Smith refers to Gibsone's dicta at p. 148 of the report as authority for this: 
" . . . There is no evidence that any merchandise was sought to be acquire, or was 
acquired, by the company; . . . The company was unorganized; . . . by the letters 
patent the three incorporators were constituted provisional directors and they were in 
office, but they had done nothing toward acquiring merchandise for the 
company; . . . " Surely this is more consistent with the view that Gibsone J., took that 
D. was owner of the goods and that the company never had an interest therein, having 
never acquired them. If the learned judge had wanted to give to s. 29 the very peculiar 
sense given to it by Smith, he would most probably have discussed the point befor 
doing so. 
216. [1943] Que. S.C. 144, at pp. 144-145. 
217. [1973] Que. C.A. 663. The court, however, refers to no authorities on this point. 
218. Ibid., at p. 667, per curiam. 
219. Ibid. 
220. Ibid. The promise of sale was made to the trustees acting qua trustees and also 
personally. The Court held that in such a case both parties had to sue as plaintiffs: they 
cannot act "unilatéralement" (p. 667) but must act jointly. In this case, this is a 
reasonable requirement because both parties are bound by the contract concluded 
under s. 29. 
221. Thus, BROSSARD, J., in Komery v. Restaurant Komery Inc. [1965] Que. Q.B. 853 at 
pp. 856-857 clearly recognized the possibility of binding a company by a pre-
incorporation trust. See also: Morin v. Morin and Provincial Hardwoods Inc. [1964] 
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"The company . . . shall forthwith become and be vested with all property and 
rights, moveable and immoveable, held for it up to the date of the letters 
patent . . . " 2" . 
Consequently, it is submitted, a trust created under s. 29 takes effect 
immediately223 on the issuance of the letters-patent. If the trustee has 
contracted for the benefit of the future company, it is bound thereby and 
cannot repudiate the agreement: its recourse would be against the trustee 
personally if it should suffer any damage as a consequence of any abuse or 
irregularity224. 
These views are also consistent with the ordinary principles of civil 
law. Whenever the Civil Code mentions that a person is seized or vested 
with property or rights, it makes an important distinction: either that 
person is vested automatically with the full rights of ownership225 or this 
vesting is qualified. In many cases, the Code indicates that a person is 
seized of property for certain purposes only226 and cannot claim as a 
consequence the title of owner. S. 29 does not qualify in such manner the 
company's rights: it "shall forthwith become and be vested with all 
property . . ."227. In a sense, the Companies Act creates an exception to 
Que. Q.B. 854, per curiam at pp. 855-856, reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada 
not on that question but on the issue whether or not in that case there existed a trust: 
vide supra, pp. 41-42. See also: The T. W. Hand Fireworks Co. v. Baikie (1911) 39 
Que. S.C. 227 at p. 231; A. ROUSSEAU, Les syndicats ont-ils une âme . . .juridique ? 
(1975) 53 C.B.R. 126, at p. 128. 
222. The French version of the text is even clearer: « La compagnie . . . est 
immédiatement saisie de toute propriété . . . » If the view taken by the Court of 
Appeal is right, as a consequence, the company can be the subject of rights and 
obligations entered into by the trustees before its existence: WEGENAST, op. cit., at 
p. 262; FORTIN, supra n. 113 at p. 89; cf. SOHMER, supra n. 149, p. 131 n. 32. 
223. « La corporation a-t-elle commencé à exister revêtue de cette obligation, absolument 
comme l'homme vient au monde avec la tache du péché originel ? » in Les Corpora-
tions peuvent-elles être obligées par quasi-contrats ? (1880) 2 La Thémis 193, 203. 
224. SMITH et RENAUD, op. cit., vol. I, p. 90 n. 40, have criticized the Giguère v. Bourque 
case, supra n. 217, on the ground that if the company is automatically bound it can 
suffer from abusive contracts or secret profits of the trustees. The weakness of this 
approach is that the company can sue the trustees if they have failed in their duties 
towards it rather than be entitled to repudiate contracts that were entered into by a 
bona fide third party. In this respect, the Court of Appeal has indicated that the 
interests of third parties are to be preferred to those of the company in questions of 
corporate promotion: Komery v. Restaurant Komery Inc. [1965] Que. Q.B. 853, at 
p. 856. 
225. See, e.g., articles 607, 795, 891 and 962 C.c. Also: J. S. JAMES, Stroud's Judicial 
Dictionary, vol. 5, 4th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1974, at p. 2939 n. 8. 
226. Articles 918, 918 b and 18% a C.c. 
227. Thus, it falls in the same category as supra n. 225: the right is an absolute one. 
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the normal rule of civil law trusts228 but, whatever be the ratio of such a 
rule, it is undeniable that the effect of s. 29 is automatic and binds the 
company on its coming into existence229. 
If the company is bound on its incorporation by such contracts, is the 
trustee freed from all liability on the agreements? If one applies the nor-
mal rule of civil law, the trustee will not be liable when the company 
becomes incorporated. Article 98li C.c. reads as follows: 
"Trustees are not personally liable to third parties with whom they contract". 
The assumption of liability by the company should, in theory, free 
the trustee from all responsability. There is no relevant case on this 
precise point under s. 29 and the authors do not discuss this issue. How-
ever, on the basis of the trust analogy suggested by Rinfret, J., in 
Laliberté v. Larue210, it is submitted that under s. 29 the trustee should be 
free from all liability on the company's incorporation. 
But what if the company is never incorporated? What if one acts as a 
trustee for a company that will never come into existence? The question 
is not an easy one and has not been considered in the context of s. 29. 
However, a few points are clear. Whether a promoter is liable on a pre-
incorporation contract depends ultimately on the other contracting 
party's state of mind: it is a simple question of intention231. The third 
party, when he contracts with a trustee under s. 29, always knows that 
the company is not in existence232: as a consequence, 
228. Article 981/ C.c. shows that the beneficiary under the trust is not seized of the prop-
erty but must receive a transfer "to vest the property held for the trust in the parties 
entitled thereto" (981/ C.c). If s. 29 does not mention the necessity of such transfer, 
then surely it is because of the automatic effect of the provision. 
229. The company is in existence from the date of issuance of its letters patent: Lalreille 
Gaz Naturel Equipement Cie Ltée v. B.C.N, et Lalonde [1967] Que. Q.B. 259 at 
p. 261, referring to s. 11 of the Companies Act. 
230. [1931] S.C.R. 7. Vide, generally, supra, pp. 361-362. 
231. GROSS, op. cit., at p. 199. For an interesting Quebec case: Hewlings v. Mirotchick, 
supra n. 177 at p. 27, and authorities cited there; SMITH, supra n. 112 at p. 214 n. 13. 
232. Because under s. 29 the trustee must contract in trust for a future corporation: see the 
discussion, supra, on the creation of the trust, pp. 363-366. 
233. GROSS, op. cit., at p. 186, and more particularly n. 71; also at p. 194 for the rationale of 
this rule. If indeed the trustee was not responsible, then the contract would have no 
effect. Thus, the parties are presumed to have wanted a binding agreement, and the 
only way this is possible is by holding the trustee liable. GROSS, ibid. For a similar 
reasoning, see SMITH, supra n. 112 at p. 214 in the general context of promoters' 
liability in Quebec. See also: Bonhomme v. Bickerdike (1900) 17 Que. S.C. 28 (C.R.) at 
p. 58, per curiam. For discussions on breach of warranty of authority in common law 
jurisdictions, vide: L. H. LEIGHT, "Breach of warranty of authority" in Studies in 
Canadian business law, Butterworths, Toronto, 1971, at pp. 359-362 (G.H.L. Frid-
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i) if the company is never incorporated, he must have intended to 
contract with the trustee personally and hold him liable on the agree-
ment233; 
ii) however, cases clearly indicate that if a trustee explicitly stipu-
lates against personal liability, the third party has no recourse234. Some 
authorities suggest however that he could always sue for damages if he 
can establish that a fraudulent representation was made to the effect that 
the company would indeed be incorporated235. 
S.29 provides an interesting solution to the question of pre-
incorporation contracts as far as binding the company before its incorpo-
ration. However, many problems still subsist and the protection of third 
parties does not seem to be increased in cases of dishonest promoters 
acting as trustees. The general rights of both the company and third 
parties will now be examined more closely from the point of view of the 
trustee's duties in civil law. 
4. The pre-incorporation trust: duties of promoters 
The duties of a trustee under s. 29 cannot be discussed without a 
more general reference to the duties of promoters in Quebec law. This 
exercise is not free from difficulties, for promoters' duties in civil law 
remain to this day a perplexing question. The view is commonly held that 
there is no jurisprudence in the Province dealing with this important 
point: one commentator points to . . . the complete absence of reported 
ecisions concerning e u y o promo ers in Que ec . . , . ow-
man ed V G SHAPIRA Directors without a company and other professine agents 
(1975) 3 0 t agoL .R . 309. 
234. The jurisprudence of our courts has always admitted this: Bonhomme v. Bickerdike 
(1900) 17 Que. S.C. 28 (C.R.) at pp. 29, 39-41; The T. W. Hand Fireworks Co. vvBaikie 
(1911) 39 Que. S.C. 227 at pp. 230-232; (1913) 43 Que. S.C. 325 (C.R.) at p. 327; 
Hewlings v. Mirotchick, supra n. 177 at pp. 24-25. GROSS, op. cit., at p. 195 for the 
position of common law provinces. See also: Canada Business Corporaiions Act 
s. 14(4); SMITH, supra n. 112 at p . 214. As pointed out by GREENSHIELDS, J., in 
Lippes v. Tult (1926) 41 Que. K.B. 566 at p. 574, "The fact that one person is incapa-
ble of contracting and does not contract does not burden another person with that 
contract . . . " On this last point, see GROSS, op. cit., at p. 198 n. 108. 
235. GROSS, op. cit., at p. 194; SMITH, supra n. 112 at p. 216. See also: Irwin v. Lessard 
(1889) 17 R.L. 589 (Q.B.) where the respondent purported to act under an authority 
given to him by the promoters of the future company but this was a false representa-
tion: ibid., at p. 593. Liability for damages was also accepted, on this principle, in 
Bonhomme v. Bickerdike (1900) 17 Que. S.C. 28 (C.R.) at pp. 56 and 58. 
236. S M I T H , supra, n. 112 at p. 288; also at p. 212. See the same author, in Liability of 
corporate execuiives for illegal profits in the company law of the Province of Quebec 
[1973] R. du B. 253 at p. 265. 
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ever, the cases do in fact yield a variety of interesting suggestions on this 
question: whether they deal with the relationship of promoters with the 
future company or its shareholders, third parties or even inter se, they 
establish a body of rules that can be easily referred to in discussing this 
issue. This article does not purport to deal exhaustively with the question 
of promoters' duties in a civil law jurisdiction, but an attempt will be made 
to enunciate certain general rules whilst examining the problem from the 
more difficult vantage point of the trustee in Quebec law. 
a) Duties of the promoter towards the company 
The jurisprudence on this point is rare but interesting. A clear ten-
dency in the case law and the commentaries is to deal with this problem 
either from the point of view of common law authorities or to adopt a 
purely civilian approach. 
/) Common law 
Most cases involving promoters' duties in Quebec have discussed 
this problem by referring to Anglo-American law. Thus, in Skelton v. 
Frigon231, the Court of Appeal cites common law precedents exclusively 
as authorities to be followed on the question of promoters' secret profits 
in Quebec238. 
Undoubtedly, the most interesting case illustrating this tendency is 
that of Larocque v. Beauchemin23,, a case from the Superior Court of the 
Province that went on appeal to Privy Council240. 
A bankrupt company sold all of its assets, valued at about $80,000. to 
the promoters of another company for $10,000. When the promoters 
bought this property, they had a clear intention of selling it to the new 
company and not to buy it for their own purposes; the company was 
subsequently incorporated and the promoters took up the whole of the 
237. (1923) 35 Que. K.B. 11; [1923] 4 D.L.R. 278 (K.B.). 
238. Ibid., at p. 11 n. 1. References are made, inter alia. to Ehrich, On Promoters, passim; 
20 Halsburyss Laws of England, 8 Corpus Juris Secundum, various English and 
American cases, and some decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada on appeal from 
the common law provinces. 
These authorities were considered by the Court in the case in issue but no serious 
discussion was entered into on their relevance to the problem or to Quebec law 
generally. 
239. (1896) 9 Que. S.C. 73 (C.R.); [1897] A.C. 358 (P.C.). 
240. Ibid. Note that this case is still considered relevant even in English law: Halsbury's 
Laws of England, vol. 7, 4th ed., Butterworths, London, 1973, at p. 35, par. 47, n. 6. 
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capital241. The company, after incorporation, bought the same properties 
from the promoters for the sum of $35,000., part of the purchase price 
being paid in cash and the balance being credited to the account of the 
promoters on the shares taken up in the company. When the new com-
pany went into liquidation, the liquidator sued the promoters for the 
payment of their shares, arguing that they had not paid for these shares in 
the manner required by the Act242 and questioning the legality of the 
promoters' conduct towards the company. The Superior Court dismissed 
the liquidator's claim and Jette, J., in the Court of Review confirmed this 
judgment243. On the issue of the promoters' profits, his Lordship said that 
this sale was valid: it was carried out in good faith244 and the true value of 
the property was at least $35,000.245. He then pointed out: 
« . . . aucune fraude, aucune simulation ne peut être reprochée aux 
actionnaires . . . L'arrangement conclu entre eux a été légal, connu et accepté 
par tous . . . »2A6. 
Thus, where promoters hold all of the share capital of a company, the 
fact that they sell property to the company at a profit does not render this 
profit an illegal one if every shareholder is aware of the circumstances of 
this sale. On appeal to the Privy Council, the same position was taken. 
Lord Macnaghten spoke for the Board: 
"Before their Lordships an attempt was made to re-open the charge of fraud . . . 
It was urged that the price of the property was not fixed or considered by an 
independent board of directors, and that in this respect the transaction was 
improper and fraudulent. This argument seems to be based on a misconception 
of the decision in Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. . . . where the facts 
were very different. In the present case it was not disputed that every single 
shareholder was perfectly aware of all the circumstances attending the formation 
of the company, and that nobody was or could have been deceived. Indeed, their 
Lordships agree with the opinion of Jette J., who prefaced his judgement by 
241. (1896) 9 Que. S.C. 73 (C.R.), per Jette, J., at p. 75. In English law, this is of great 
consequence: GROSS, op. cit., at p. 127 and following. 
242. The case also dealt with the question of adequate payment for shares. In the old 
statutes, legislation was enacted directing that shares must be paid for in cash. Other-
wise, a contract should be deposited with the Secretary of the Province if payment in 
kind was to be accepted. On this aspect of the case, see the interesting historical 
analysis in RENAUD et SMITH, op. cit., vol. 2 at pp. 611-613, and more particularly at 
p. 631 n. 50. Compare with English law, where this is still a requirement under the 
Companies Act, 1948: s. 52 and GOWER, op. cit., at pp. 106-107. 
243. Tait, A.C.J., delivered the judgment in the Superior Court. 
244. (1896) 9 Que. S.C. 73 (C.R.), at p. 76. 
245. Ibid., at pp. 76 and 82. 
246. Ibid., at p. 82. 
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observing that the promoters acted in perfect good faith, and that the value of the 
property was proved to be $35,000. at least. »247 
A triple test thus emerges from this case: bona fides, full disclosure 
and true value will, as a rule, relieve the promoters of liability for any 
profit made in a sale to the company. Later jurisprudence however was to 
abandon the requirement of fair value248 and the rule now seems to be in 
Quebec, under these authorities, that full disclosure must be made to an 
independent board of directors, but if the promoters hold all of the share 
capital of the company, there is no necessity in meeting this re-
quirement249. 
Many problems relating to these questions have not received any 
attention from the provincial courts. However, when one considers that 
these rules, in common law, are predicated on principles governing 
fiduciary duties generally250, their application to the law of Quebec can be 
seriously questioned. The civil law knows of no fiduciary duties: it knows 
of trustees, mandataries and other representatives but the duties incum-
bent upon such persons are defined strictly according to the Civil 
Code251. In that sense, the whole of the English law on this point should 
receive no direct application in our law: as a solution of comparative law, 
it is of undoubted interest, but the problem of promoters' duties in 
Quebec should be resolved by application of the principles of the Civil 
Code governing their relationship to the company. 
247. [1897] A.C. 358, in the Privy Council at p. 364, referring to the Erlanger case reported 
at: (1878) 3 A.C. 1218. 
248. Acuriouscaseis:A.G.fortheDominionof Canada v. The Standard Trust Company of 
New York. A report of the decisions of each tribunal can be found in: [1911-12] Can. 
Rep. 1 (P.C.)) See Also: :1911] A.C. 498 (P.C.)) This case was approved in: Eisenberg 
v. Bank of Nova Scotia [1965] S.C.R. 681 at pp. 688-689. The case settled a few ques-
tions. Disclosure to the company was taken to mean to all present andfuture sharehol-
ders: per Davies, J., in the Supreme Court at p. 17 of the Report; per Viscount Haldane 
in the Privy Council at pp. 39-40. See also GROSS, op. cit., at pp. 98-99. This duty how-
ever does not extend to debenture holders: GROSS, op. cit., at p. 109 n. 73 referring to the 
case under examination. American law takes a wider view of the question: ibid., at 
pp. 109-111. The case also decided that if all the shareholders have assented to the sale, 
the relevance of the reasonableness of the price does not arise: per Davies, J., in the 
Supreme Court at p. 21. American law takes a different view of the question: as pointed 
out by GROSS, " . . . t h e burden of proff will still centre on the fairness and reasonable-
ness of the transaction . . .": GROSS, op. cit., at pp. 96, 104. 
249. A few cases contain very cryptic dicta that seem to be reconcilable only with this 
proposition: Chinic v. Canada Steel Co. (1876) 3 Q.L.R. 1 (C.R.) at pp. 2-3: Dame 
Dupaul v. Varyland Investment Co. (1923) 35 Que. K.B. 328 at p. 332: « Qu'il ait 
stipulé un profit considérable que lui devait rembourser la compagnie, cela s'est fait 
ouvertement. . . » (per Létourneau, J.). Generally, see GROSS, op. cit. at pp. 94-95. 
250. GROSS, op. cit., at pp. 79-83, 89 and following. 
251. SMITH, supra n. 112 at p. 288. 
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/'/) Civil law 
It is at this point that a convenient distinction must be made. In 
Quebec, a promoter might be considered, for the purposes of legal clas-
sification, from two angles: he is either acting as a promoter generally or 
he is specifically acting under a trust established in pursuance to s. 29 of 
the Companies Act. If he is acting as a simple promoter, under what 
section of the Code should he be considered? The question in our jurisdic-
tion is a novel one and was not considered at all for over a century: 
however, recent research has suggested that there is authority in the 
decisions of the provincial courts for considering the promoter as a mere 
negotiorum gestor251. This convenient classification has one undoubted 
advantage: it allows for the imposition on the promoter of a set of duties 
and obligations consistent with the economy of civil law. Thus, article 
1043 C.c. tells us, in fine, that the gestor "subjects himself to all the 
obligations which result from an express mandate". If one then turns to 
the rules of mandate, one sees that all mandataries are subjected, by law, 
to a duty to account to their mandator for all secret profits received during 
the execution of such mandate253. 
A promoter would be bound to account to the company for all profits 
made during the promotion under these rules: he would, inter alia, have 
to render to the company any secret profit made in pursuance of a sale 
thereto, unless of course he declares such profit to the company254. The 
rule, in a sense, would be the same as in English law: being, however, 
more in accordance with the principles of the Code, it should be preferred 
to English authorities on this point. 
But if the promoter is acting as a trustee, the problem varies slightly. 
As established previously, trustees under particular statutes in the Pro-
vince are subjected to the same regimen as the civil law trustee, and as a 
consequence the rules of articles 981a and following of the Code apply to 
such persons255. If this is so, they must also render an account of the 
profits they might have made in any sale to the company in pursuance of 
their duty to account, specified at article 981 / C.c. No case deals with this 
point under s. 29 of the Act: however, when one considers the trust analogy 
established by Rinfred, J., in Laliberté v. Larue226, this approach seems 
252. SMITH, ibid., at pp. 226-232, 286-289 and 293-295. 
253. Article 1713 C.c. 
254. Supra, pp. 373-375. 
255. Supra, pp. 361-362. 
256. [1931] S.C.R. 7 and supra, pp. 361-362. 
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justified. A duty to account exists in civil law and is required from every 
trustee, whether he is acting under the Civil code257 or under statute258. 
The conclusion on this complicated question is that the problem of 
imposing duties on promoters in Quebec should be re-examined: whether 
one approaches the promoter as gestor or trustee, the result is the same 
and in both cases he has to account to the company for monies improperly 
obtained. The ramifications and variations that spring from this theoreti-
cal approach will only be settled by future jurisprudence: it is hoped that 
the provincial judges will not leave the terra fuma of civil law when they 
are next called upon to discuss and settle this question of considerable 
importance. 
Hi) The control of the Securities Act over the secret profits of pro-
moters 
The problem of controlling the profits of promoters in Quebec has 
taken an interesting turn. In America, promoters' secret profits have now 
become a point of secondary interest: the strict control exercised over 
promoters generally by securities legislation has brought about a decline 
in litigation over such questions. Bruenner and Gilley observe: 
" . . . since the passage of the Act requiring disclosure of promotional profits and 
interests in the appropriate part of the prospectus, very few cases have arisen 
seeking the recovery of promoters' profits . . ."2 5 9 . 
The provincial Securities Act contains similar regulations. For any 
person to try to obtain any "gross profit incompatible with the practice of 
the trade . . ."26° is considered tantamount to fraud. It also imposes on 
the promoter the obligation of signing a statutory declaration as to the 
257. 981/ C . c ; Racine v. Barry [1957] S.C.R. 92 at p. 98. 
258. It is of interest to note that the other statutory trustee of civil law is under a similar 
duty to account. Thus, in the recent case of In re Gérard Nolin Liée: Bellavance v. 
B.C.N. [1974] Que. S.C. 641, it was held that a trustee under the Special Corporate 
Powers Act R.S.Q. 1964 c. 275 had a duty to account and that this duty was to be 
exercised according to the principles of civil law. 
259. Promoters and their profits (1958) 13 Bus. Law. 429 at p. 433; GROSS,op . cit., at p. 155 
n. 48. 
260. R.S.Q. 1964 c. 274 s. 35 (d); RENAUD et SMITH, op. cit., vol. 2 at p. 1193. Is such a 
fraudulent act to be considered as an ordinary civil law fraud?Semble, in common law 
provinces at least, that the statutory offences cannot be viewed as such. See Re 
Attorney General for Ontario and Huteson (1930-31) 66 O.L.R. 387. Also: WEGENAST, 
op. cit., at p. 697; Y. CARON, Aspecss du droit des valeurs mobilière,, (1971) 17 McGill 
L.J. 234, at p. 287. 
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correctness of the statements contained in the prospectus261: this is im-
portant because the Regulations force the promoter to declare in the 
prospectus all preliminary expenses262, details concerning the sale to the 
company of property acquired from the promoters263, and any payment 
made to the latter264. Full disclosure of these transactions will usually 
discourage the promoter from attempting to defraud the Securities Com-
mission or the company, for the civil and criminal sanctions attaching to 
such violations are severe265. Not content with having set out certain 
standards in the Act and the Regulations, the Legislature also gave the 
Securities Commission wide powers of discretion in this matter266 and the 
Commission, in various administrative decisions, has made known to 
securities issuers generally that it will not grant permission to float an 
issue if certain safeguards are not met. In relation to promoters, the most 
important of these are the following: 
Bona fides: the Commission must be convinced that the issue is a 
bona fide one and not in the interests of the promoters only267. 
Shares in escrow: in order to ensure that the promoters will act 
honestly, the Commission requires that all shares issued to promoters in 
consideration of their services or in payment of property sold to the 
company be escrowed268. 
Minimal capital: where the directors have stated that a minimal capi-
tal will be necessary for adequate operations269, the Commission insists 
that an independent trustee be appointed to hold such monies till this 
requirement is met270. This is certainly a remarkable feature. As seen 
above, minimal capital requirements in the older Companies Acts were 
261. Regulations Made under An Act Respecting Securities O.C. 2745-73, Que. Reg. 73-417 
as amended by O.C. 3963-73, Que. Reg. 73-550 and O.C. 1260-74, Que. Reg. 74-172, at 
ss. 5(2) and 5(3). [Hereinafter referred to as the Regulations.] 
262. Regulaiion,, s. 5(l)(a); Annex 'A' , s. 20. 
263. Ibid., Annex 'A ' , ss. 21, 22, 27 and 28. 
264. Ibid., Annex 'A' , s. 26. R E N A U D et S M I T H , op. cit., vol. 2 at pp. 1211-1212. 
265. S. 84 of the Securities Act. If the promoter's declaration is false, he is liable for 
damages under article 1053 C.c. for such fraud: Yuksel Atillasoy v. Crown Trust Co. 
[1974] Que. C.A. 442, at pp. 447-448. Also, Martel, op. cit., vol. 2 at p. 356; GOWER, 
op. cit., at pp. 292, 317 and 320. 
266. R E N A U D et SMITH, op. cit,, vol. 2 at pp. 1188-1189. 
267. R E N A U D et SMITH, op. cit., vol. 2 at pp. 1192-1193. Bona fides was once a require-
ment set out by the Courts: see supra, pp. 374-375. 
268. /6 i r f . , a tp . 1193. 
269. Regulations, supra n. 261 s. 5(l)(a); Annex 'A ' s. 15. 
270. RENAUD et SMITH, op. cit., vol. 2 at p. 1194. This requirement applies only in cases 
where the issue is not taken up wholly by an underwriter: ibid. See also at pp. 1212 and 
1238. 
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essentially enacted as a protection against the fraud of promoters271. With 
the advent of modern securities legislation, they disappeared from the 
statute books272. However, what was once a statutory requirement has 
now somehow reappeared as an administrative device of some importan-
ce273. The presence of the trustee is also noticeable: trustees for the 
purposes of holding minimal subscriptions became an anomaly in our law 
after 1920274 and their reappearance in the administrative requirements 
set by the Securities Commission indicates the persistent influence of 
English institutions in this field275. 
Options: finally, options granted to promoters are subjected to strict 
regulation and are generally viewed critically by the Commission276. 
The problem of dealing with duties of promoters in Quebec has thus 
been greatly minimized by the legislative and administrative directives 
under the Securities Act: the active role played by the Securities Commis-
sion in this field also highlights the remarkable transition from the tradi-
271. Supra, pp. 358-360. 
272. In re Richeiieu Oil Co. Ltd.: J. A. Coulombe et J.A. Coulombe Co. Ltd. [1950] Que. 
K.B. 714 at p. 722. 
273. A clear pattern emerges from this legislative history: statutory protection of investors 
has now slowly disappeared from the Companies Act but the same preoccupations 
can be found at the administrative level. A good example is the method of payment for 
shares. In the old Acts, this was rigorously scrutinised: RENAUD et SMITH, op. cit. 
vol. 2 at pp. 611-613. Now this question is dealt with in s. 23 of Annex 'A' attached to 
the Regulaiions under the Securities Act. 
21 A. Supra, pp. 357-358. 
275. Note RENAUD et SMITH, op. cit., vol. 2 at p. 1194 referring to a decision of the 
Securities Commission commenting on the « . . . impossibilité dans le droit québécois 
de créer une fiducie sauf dans des cas spécifiques . . . » (Farmex Enterprises Inc.: 
ibid., p. 1194 n. 356 for the reference). If the Commission recognizes this difficulty, 
why does it require a trustee in this case? A solution to this problem can be found in 
French law. Minimal subscriptions must also be held in French law by an independent 
party: trustees being unknown to French civil law, use is made of a dépositaire. See: 
HÉMARD, TERRÉ et MABILAT, Sociétés commerciales, vol. 1, Dalloz, Paris, 1972, at 
pp. 620-23; ESCARRA et RAULT, op. cit., vol. I, p. 125 n. 621 where the authors tell us 
that such requirements were instituted as a protection against the fraud of promoters. 
See also Note (1969) 22 Rev. Trim. Dr. Comm. 1004-05. Thus, in Quebec, if minimal 
capital requirements are to be utilised again, would it not be more logical to use a 
dépositaire as opposed to a trustee in order to avoid creating unnecessary complica-
tions? On deposit, see articles 1794-1812 C.c. It is interesting to note that in the 
Proposals for a New Business Corporaiion Law for Canada, vol. 2, Information 
Canada, Ottawa, 1971, par. I5.23(I)(e), the necessity of a pre-incorporation trustee to 
hold monies pending the incorporation was suggested but was not retained in the final 
version of the Act. 
276. RENAUD et SMITH, op. cit., vol. 2 at pp. 1195-1196. Compare with GROSS, op. cit., at 
pp. 145-147. 
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tional protection afforded by the older corporate statutes to a more active 
supervision of the share markets by an independent body277. 
b) Duties of the promoter towards third parties 
Apart from the general liability of the promoter on a contractual 
basis278, most duties of promoters in dealing with third parties are ordinar-
ily discussed in relation with misrepresentations and fraud in the prepara-
tion of prospectuses. This question is too complex in itself to be examined 
in detail in this paper but, for the purpose of the discussion, it might 
suffice to recall that fraud in civil law is a delict279 and gives rise to 
liability under the general delictual provision of the Civil Code, 
article 1053. A promoter dealing fraudulently with a third person will give 
the latter a personal action in damages for his misrepresentations: in this 
field, courts have applied common law280 or civil law principles281 without 
much consistency. However, such cases underline clearly that the pri-
mary obligation of promoters when dealing with the investing public is one 
of honesty and good faith282. 
c) Duties of promoters inter se 
Promoters, as a rule, do not necessarily create among themselves any 
particular relationship: the fact that more than one person acts in the 
promotion of a company is no indication that such persons have man-
ifested the intention of creating a partnership of promoters283. However, 
jurisprudence admits the possibility of creating promotion syndicates and 
in such cases, participants would be bound towards each other by the 
ordinary rules of civil law partnership284. There is even some suggestion 
277. GROSS, op. cit,, at p. 112 n. 86. 
278. Supra, pp. 371-372. 
279. J .L. Baudouin, Les Obligations, P.U.M., Montréal, 1970, at p. 83, n. 136. 
280. Bergeron v. La Compagnee de meubles de Jonquière (1913) 22 Que. K.B. 341 at 
pp. 349-351 where ihe Court refers to various authorities of English law and the locus 
classicus on this point: Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 A.C. 337. 
281. Bonhomme v. Bickerdike (1900) 17 Que. S.C. 28 (C.R.). 
282. R.R. Pennington, The Investor and the Law, Macbibbon & Kee, London, 1968 at 
pp. 176 and following. See also SMITH et RENAUD, op. cit., vol. 3, at pp. 1428-1437. 
283. Vipond v. Robert (1908) 17 Que. K.B. 403 at pp. 415-416fw Bossé, J.: compare with 
GROSS, op. cit,, at pp. 164-167. 
284. MITCHELL, op. cit., at pp. 19-20, 254-255. Hopper v. Hoctor (1905) 35 S.C.R. 645; 
Komery v. Restaurant Komery Inc. [1965] Que. Q.B. 853 at p . 857. See also the 
Companies Information Act R.S.Q. 1964 c. 273 s. 3 where the possibility of creating 
such a partnership seems admitted. Some of our courts have taken the unusual view 
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in the cases that pre-incorporation trustees might also enter into some 
form of société™ and be bound by the same rules286. Parties might also 
wish to prepare a pre-incorporation voting agreement and in such a case, 
their relationship would be governed by the ordinary rules of contract287. 
In Quebec law, the promoter, whether he be considered as agestor 
or a trustee under section 29 of the Companies Act is thus bound by a 
clear set of duties that is remarkably similar in substance to those imposed 
on promoters in common law jurisdictions. However, the interest of such 
an analysis is not to create confusion for the pleasure of uncertainty but to 
indicate than in a civil law jurisdiction it is inevitable that corporate pro-
motions will be regulated by principles peculiar to the economy of civil law 
and that uncritical references to common law precedents brings about 
much more obscurity on such points than the contrary exercise. 
Conclusion 
From the historical perspective, one can draw interesting conclu-
sions. The existence of unincorporated companies in Quebec as early as 
the late eighteenth century288 is proof that English law had considerable 
influence in the field of corporate activities even before the enactment in 
1868 of a Companies Act modelled on the English statute289. However, 
that influence had clear limits: as seen above, the provincial courts and 
legislature soon intervened and indicated that such companies in Quebec 
were nothing more than ordinary partnerships familiar to civil law. In a 
sense, by assimilating the unincorporated company to a mere société, 
jurists in the Province demonstrated their determination to preserve the 
purity of the civil law heritage. 
that the pre-incorporation partnership is sometimes continued in the new company: 
The Windsor Hotel Co. v. Date (1881) 27 L.C.J. 7 (S.C.) at p. 10 and a similar view is 
sometimes accepted in America: GROSS, op. cit. p. 172 n. 7. This view, as far as 
Quebec law is concerned, has been severely criticized and is not followed. Vide 
Smith, supra n. 112 at pp. 230-232. 
285. Brossard, J., in the Komery case, ibid., said at p. 857: « Les actes posés par les 
membres de la société sui generis constituée pour fins d'incorporation ne peuvent, 
sous les réserves sousdites quant au fidéicommis, lier, in futurum, une compagnie non 
encore formée . . . ». 
286. Articles 1839 and following C e . 
287. A good example is to be found in Latrellle Gaz Naturel Equipement Co. Ltd. v. B.C.N. 
[1967] Que. Q.B. 259 at pp. 259-260. Vide also the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in: Tannenbaum v. Sears & S. Sears Real Estate Ltd. [1972] S.C.R. 67 (Ont.) and a 
comment on that case: SOHMER, supra n. 149 at pp. 128-130. 
288. Supra, p. 347. 
289. Larocque v. Beauchemnn (1896) 9 Que. S.C. 73 (C.R.), at p. 76. 
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The discussion on unincorporated companies introduced an exami-
nation of the problems created by the pre-incorporation trust in Quebec. 
Notwithstanding its obscure origins290, the pre-incorporation trust soon 
became a valuable promotional device and one notices, in recent years, a 
proliferation of cases dealing with this issue. Two remarkable features 
can be observed in this discussion. Firstly, a similar process of assimila-
tion is apparent in this case as in the case of the unincorporated company: 
serious authorities suggest that the trust created under s. 29 of the Com-
panies Act must be understood according to the rules of civil law trusts 
and not those of common law. Thus, when one studies the reactions of the 
provincial judiciary to the pre-incorporation trust and the unincorporated 
body, one finds in both instances a tendency of trying to assimilate com-
mon law inspired institutions to the rules of civil law. 
The second point of interest in the discussion under s. 29 of the Act is 
that it highlights a clear transition in the legislative techniques utilised to 
protect investors. The earlier corporate statutes offered numerous 
safeguards against the fraud of promoters and a good example of this 
preoccupation was the minimal capital requirement. This legislative ap-
proach has been abandoned over the years in favour of the more flexible 
control afforded by the Securities Act. The control of promotional ir-
regularities is best carried out by an ad hoc investigation on the part of the 
Securities Commission as opposed to the rather rigid statutory safeguards 
that are more easily avoided. Finally, it becomes increasingly clear that, 
whether the problems of investor protection in Quebec are approached 
from the viewpoint of the Companies Act or the Securities Act, the ines-
capable conclusion is that the incidence of civil law on such questions 
cannot be avoided and must be considered in its many implications. 
290. Supra, p. 354. The pre-incorporation trust was thus a creature of jurisprudence: 
perhaps an application of the maxim "communis error facit jus" is apposite in this 
case. See H. BROOM, A selection of legal maxims, 10th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1939, at pp. 86-87. 
